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OPPOSITION TO RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS:

Statement by Assistant Secretary Lindsay 544

Protest Notes of Eight Governments 545

THE PATTERN OF U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS •

by George F. Allen 523

CZECHOSLOVAK SUBVERSION CHARGES AGAINST

U.S. REFUTED • Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. . . 529

REVIEW OF THE ECE ECONOMIC SURVEY OF

EUROPE • Statement by Milton Camp 534

For index see back cover



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The Pattern of U.S.-Indian Relations

by *George V. Allen*
*Ambassador to India*¹

I am deeply sensible of the friendly spirit which has motivated the India League of America in inviting me to be with you here today. It is a source of considerable satisfaction to us who work in the official or governmental sphere of U.S.-India relations to know that there is a group of men and women, distinguished in the professions, the arts, and business, who at the same time are actively engaged in a private effort to increase understanding between the United States and India and further to strengthen relations between the two.

I believe the key to sound and enduring relations between nations lies in private effort in whatever sphere—cultural relations, education, economic assistance, or trade and finance—by organizations such as yours. Official or government action is of course necessary, but it has substance only insofar as the atmosphere of friendship has been created between the peoples of the countries concerned.

I am aware that the India League of America has been active for many years. Before India's independence it was effective in mobilizing opinion in this country on behalf of India's freedom. Since then it has been in the forefront as a private agency for the dissemination of information about India and U.S.-Indian affairs and for the development of closer understanding between our two peoples.

Only a few days ago land was allotted in Washington, D. C., for the site of a Gandhi memorial—a project which was conceived and is being carried out by the League. In activity of this sort, in which private citizens show by action their interest in India and in the development of better understanding, there is, in my opinion, far more value than any number of speeches by government officers or diplomats which proclaim friendship and understanding which may or may not exist. And as these private and spontaneous actions continue, official declarations of friendship will inevitably carry more weight and conviction.

¹ Remarks made before the India League of America at New York City on Apr. 1.

I am very glad to find myself once again professionally concerned with U.S.-Indian relations after a lapse of 7 years in somewhat different work. Prior to my assignment in 1946 as Ambassador to Iran, I shared in the work of that part of the Department of State which dealt with Indian affairs. This was before Indian independence, and, of course, there have been great changes since then. Then, India was the greatest jewel in the crown of empire. Now it is the largest democratic republic in the world. Then, Indian leaders were revolutionaries; today, many of these revolutionaries hold the responsibilities of government and grapple with different but perhaps no less difficult problems.

No man could approach the assignment I have been given but with humility and a full awareness of the challenge the assignment offers. Yet I have every confidence that my work will be easier because, I believe, the broad pattern of U. S.-Indian relations has already been well-established. That pattern involves growing understanding and friendship between the two countries and closer, more fruitful cooperation in international affairs. It is based on scrupulous care that the sovereignty and national aspirations of each not be offended.

We attach the greatest importance to the efforts which India is making to develop its economy and improve the lot of its people. If those efforts succeed, it will encourage peoples throughout Asia and fortify faith in democratic methods everywhere. If they do not succeed, the very foundations of the Indian Republic and of the Orient may be shaken. America's interest, in one sentence, is that India, which has achieved full sovereign status, shall retain that status completely, and that the faith which the vast majority of the Indian people have in democracy's ability to give them a better and fuller life be sustained and fortified.

India's problems are in a very real sense the world's problems, and many nations, recognizing this, are offering whatever help they can. The United States is in the forefront as regards mate-

rial help and moral encouragement to India. We do not give our help as charity; on the contrary, our help has been in the nature of an investment in India's sovereignty and independence. We, and the rest of the free world, stand to receive rich dividends in strengthened democracy and in developing a strong spiritual bastion against the heartless and dangerous forces of materialism.

I am confident that we will continue to offer our help and encouragement.

There is in the United States today an ever-growing understanding of India's problems and sympathy for India's courageous efforts, and in India's position, in the world or its great potential.

I am unaware of any proposals under consideration which would reverse or cancel the policies which the United States has been following for some time and which have received the support of Republicans and Democrats alike. Rather, I think you may find a quickened interest in India, and an even stronger determination, on our part, to clear up any misunderstanding and to reaffirm by word and deed our abiding friendship for India. To this end I have dedicated myself and ask your continued help and support.

Assessment of Soviet Gestures

Remarks by Secretary Dulles

Press release 173 dated April 3

In response to various questions concerning the assessment placed by the United States on recent Soviet moves and their possible outcome, Secretary Dulles made the following extemporaneous remarks at his news conference on April 3:

Nothing that has happened, or which seems to me likely to happen, has changed the basic situation of danger in which we stand. There are three basic facts which, I think, we should always have in mind as long as they are the facts.

The first is this: The Soviet Union is a heavily armed totalitarian state, subject to the dictates of a small group, whose total control extends to one-third of the people, and the natural resources of the world.

The second fact is that the leaders of the Soviet Union are basically and deeply hostile to any other state which does not accept Soviet Communist control. That is part of their fanatically held creed.

The third fact is that the Soviet Communist leaders do not recognize any moral inhibitions against the use of violence. In fact, they do not admit the existence of such a thing as the moral law.

Now those facts combine to create a grave danger, and as I said, nothing that has happened or seems likely to happen in the near future ends that danger, or our need, or the need of the free

world generally, to take precautions against it. That, however, does not prevent accommodations from time to time which may be useful—useful if, but only if, they do not blind us to the persistence of the danger.

At the moment I see nothing which ends that danger or would justify us in changing any of our basic defensive policies, either alone or in conjunction with our allies. Now, there are, as I have said, possibilities of useful accommodation that could relate to such matters as the exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war in Korea, and if good faith is shown in relation to that, then there may be the possibility of an armistice in Korea.

There is a question of an Austrian treaty which could also be a matter of accommodation.

There are a whole series of outstanding questions which can be a matter of accommodation.

The point I want to make is that so long as these three conditions persist, to which I referred, we must not, in my opinion, assume that the danger is over and that we are living in a peaceful world which requires neither armament nor our allies.

I see nothing which should delay or hamper the European Defense Community and the other basic policy measures that we are trying to take.

Asked whether there was any inconsistency between this view and that expressed by President Eisenhower the day before,¹ Mr. Dulles replied:

I am confident that the general philosophy which I have expressed is the philosophy of the administration. The President said, I think—I haven't actually seen the transcript of his statement—that we are prepared to take up concrete matters, such as peace in Asia, where it is to our advantage to do so, and test out the Communist words, in practical operation.

I think that the events that are happening are, to a very large extent, due to the vigorous position which the Eisenhower administration has taken since it has been in office.

We have had indications from so-called neutral sources in contact with the Soviet Union that the leaders there were waiting to see what the policies of the new administration would be, whether they would be weak or strong policies.

Now, in fact, we have taken some fairly strong policies, both in Asia and in Europe.

In Asia we have ended the orders of the Seventh Fleet which protected the Chinese Communist Mainland. We have intensified the build-up of indigenous forces, South Korean forces, in the Republic of Korea. We indicated to the French our disposition to increase help to them there. We pointed out that an armistice in Korea could not be used as a basis for enabling the Chinese

¹ At his press conference on Apr. 2, the President said that the United States should take at face value every offer that was made until it was proved not to be worthy of being so taken.

Communists to shift their forces and to commit aggression elsewhere, or at least if they attempted that it would have serious consequences.

In Europe, we have actively revived the program for a European Defense Community, and increased unity—military, in the first instance; ultimately, political, and economic.

In all those respects we have had vigorous, positive policies. In my opinion they are beginning to bear some fruit, although how much that fruit will turn out to be still remains to be tested. It is still in words primarily rather than in actual deeds.

Fourth Anniversary of NATO

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

White House press release dated April 4

Just 4 years ago today the representatives of 12 free nations met in Washington to sign their names to a document which free men will long remember. That document was the North Atlantic Treaty.

In the years since that date other nations have signed their names and pledged their strength—to make NATO the central source of strength for defense of the western world.

This year it happens that we commemorate the anniversary of NATO at Easter time. To peoples of all faiths the spiritual idea of the Prince of Peace carries meaning. And NATO is an instrument of peace. It endangers none who will respect freedom. It serves all who love freedom—and wish to enjoy it in peace.

We have learned from bitter and conclusive experience that peace cannot be defended by the weak. It demands strength—strength of our armies, strength of our economies, and, above all, strength of our spirit.

This strength can be born only of unity. NATO signifies the resolve of the free nations of the North Atlantic community to be united against any aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty served notice that an attack upon any of the NATO countries would be resisted by all. It did yet more: It called upon all participating nations to develop that strength which could not only win war but more importantly could prevent war.

The two hundred million people of the NATO nations of Europe are in the deepest sense bound

together by a unity more profound than any pact. They are skilled in work, courageous in spirit, and tenacious in their love of freedom. They—their spirit and strength and resources—are indispensable to the defense of freedom everywhere. If they and their resources ever were captured and exploited by an aggressor, there would be no corner of safety anywhere in the world. But so long as these people and these resources are joined with those of the United States in our common cause, no aggressor can be blind to the folly of attack.

The work of NATO is far from complete. This anniversary, then, should be the signal for all NATO nations to dedicate themselves with renewed vigor to the work that remains to be done. So doing, each and all must know that they are serving—not the wishes or needs of some big alien power, nor even a lofty abstract ideal—but simply their own salvation and survival in freedom.

Each and all must remind themselves that the faint of heart and the slow of deed are the first and the surest to invite the torment of aggression.

Each and all of us must summon to mind the words of Him whom we honor this Easter time: "When a strong man, armed, keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace."

Secretary Dulles' Message to Lord Ismay¹

On this fourth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty I want to extend to you, and through you to the chairman of the North Atlantic Council and the representatives of other NATO Governments, the greetings of the Government of the United States. Let me also express appreciation of the imaginative and devoted leadership you have demonstrated during the past year. It has been a year of substantial progress, and with continued unity of effort there is reason to hope that even greater progress can be achieved during the coming year. I can assure you of the continued interest and co-operation of the U.S. Government, because we are convinced that a strong and enduring Atlantic partnership is vitally important to the security and peace of the entire world.

¹ Sent on Apr. 3. Lord Ismay is Secretary-General of NATO.

Proposal for Settlement of Korean Prisoner-of-War Question

Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China on March 30 proposed that negotiations should begin at once on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in Korea, and that, after the cessation of hostilities, all prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated should be turned over to a neutral country "so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation." Following is the text of his statement, which was broadcast by the New China News Agency (Radio Peiping), together with a statement by Lincoln White, Deputy Special Assistant for Press Relations, a letter from Gen. Mark Clark to the Communist Commanders, and a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

CHOU EN-LAI'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 30¹

U.N. doc. A/2378
Dated March 31, 1953

Enclosed herewith the full text of my statement on the question of the Korean armistice negotiations issued on 30 March 1953. Please distribute the full text of this statement to all the delegations of the member states of the United Nations, except the so-called "delegation" of the remnant Chinese Kuomintang clique.

[Enclosure]

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, having jointly studied the proposal put forward by Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, on Feb. 22, 1953, concerning the exchange of sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities, are of the common opinion that it is entirely possible to achieve a reasonable settlement of this question in accordance with the provision of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

A reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war clearly has a very significant bearing upon the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war. It is, therefore, our view that the time should be considered ripe for settling the entire question of prisoners of war in order to insure the cessation of hostilities in Korea and to conclude the armistice agreement.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea hold in common that the delegates of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to the armistice negotiations and the delegates of the United Nations Command to the armistice negotiations should immediately start negotiations on the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities, and should proceed to seek an over-all settlement of the question of prisoners of war.

The Korean armistice negotiations in the past one year and more have already laid the foundation for the realization of an armistice in Korea. In the course of the negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom, the delegates of both sides have reached agreement on all questions except that of prisoners of war.

In the first place, on the question of a ceasefire in Korea, about which the whole world is concerned, both sides have already agreed that "the Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed" (Paragraph 12 of the draft Korean armistice agreement).²

Secondly, both sides have further reached agreement on the various important conditions for an armistice. On the question of fixing a military demarcation line and establishing a demilitarized zone, both sides have already agreed that the actual line of contact between both sides at the time when the armistice agreement becomes effective shall be made the military demarcation line and that "both sides shall withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces . . . as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities" (Paragraph 1 of the draft armistice agreement).

On the question of supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and settling violations of the armistice agreement, both sides have already agreed that a military armistice commission, composed of five senior officers appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and five senior officers appointed by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, shall be set up to be responsible for the supervision of the implementation of the armistice agreement, including the supervision and direction of the committee for repatriation of prisoners of war, and for settling through negotiations any violations of the armistice agreement (Paragraphs 19, 20, 24, 25 and 56 of the draft armistice agreement); both sides have also agreed that a neutral nation's supervisory commission shall be set up, composed of two senior officers appointed as representatives by Poland and Czechoslovakia, neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and two senior officers appointed as representatives by Sweden and Switzerland, neutral nations nominated by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, and that under this commission there shall be provided neutral nations inspection

¹ Cablegram sent to President Lester B. Pearson of the U.N. General Assembly by the Communist Chinese Premier.

² U. N. doc. A/2228, Annex A.

teams composed of officers appointed as members to the teams by the aforementioned nations.

These inspection teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry in North Korea: Sinuiju, Chongjin, Hungnam, Manpo, Sinanju, and at the following ports of entry in South Korea: Inchon, Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung and Kunsan, to supervise and inspect the implementation of the provisions that both sides cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel and combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition (except for rotation and replacement as permitted by these provisions), and may conduct special observations and inspections at those places outside the demilitarized zone where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, so as to ensure the stability of the military armistice (Paragraphs 36, 37, 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the draft armistice agreement).

In addition, both sides have reached agreement that "the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiations the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." (Paragraph 60 of the draft armistice agreement).

As stated above, in the course of the Korean armistice negotiations one question alone—the question of prisoners of war—blocks the realization of an armistice in Korea. And even with respect to the question of prisoners of war, both sides have reached agreement on all the provisions in the draft armistice agreement on the arrangements relating to prisoners of war, except on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war. Had the Korean armistice negotiations not been interrupted for more than five months, a solution might long since have been found to this issue of the repatriation of prisoners of war.

Now inasmuch as the United Nations Command has proposed to settle, in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention, the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities, we consider that subsequent upon the reasonable settlement of the question of sick and injured prisoners of war, it is entirely a matter of course that a smooth solution to the whole question of prisoners of war should be achieved, provided that both sides are prompted by real sincerity to bring about an armistice in Korea in the spirit of mutual compromise.

Regarding the question of prisoners of war, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have always held and continue to hold that a reasonable solution can only lie in the release and repatriation of war prisoners without delay after the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the stipulations of the 1949 Geneva Convention, particularly those of Article 118 of the convention.

However, in view of the fact that the differences between the two sides on this question now constitute the

only obstacle to the realization of an armistice in Korea, and in order to satisfy the desire of the people of the world for peace, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in pursuance of their consistently maintained peace policy and their position of consistently working for the speedy realization of an armistice in Korea and striving for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, thus to preserve and consolidate world peace, are prepared to take steps to eliminate the differences on this question so as to bring about an armistice in Korea.

To this end, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea propose that both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.

It must be pointed out that, in advancing this proposal, we by no means relinquish the principle of release and repatriation of war prisoners without delay after the cessation of hostilities set forth in Article 118 of the Geneva Convention, nor do we acknowledge the assertion of the United Nations Command that there are among the prisoners of war individuals who allegedly refuse repatriation.

It is only because the termination of the bloody war in Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is bound up with the question of the peace and security of the people of the Far East and the world that we take this new step and propose that, after the cessation of hostilities, those captured personnel of our side who, under the intimidation and oppression of the opposite side, are filled with apprehensions and are afraid to return home, be handed over to a neutral state and that explanations be given them by the side concerned, thus insuring that the question of their repatriation will be justly settled and will not obstruct the realization of an armistice in Korea.

We are convinced that this new step taken by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for terminating the hostilities in Korea is in complete accord with the vital interests of the peoples whose sons are fighting on both sides in Korea and is also in complete accord with the fundamental interests of the people of the whole world. If the United Nations Command has the good faith to seek peace, this proposal of our side ought to be accepted by it.

STATEMENT BY PRESS OFFICER WHITE

At a news conference on March 30, Lincoln White made the following statement in reply to questions concerning proposals for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war:

After more than 10 months, beginning in December 1951, of fruitless efforts by the U.N. Command

This apportionment shall be carried out on the following basis:

"(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend shall bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.

"(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The Parties concerned shall agree between themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining costs of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners of war."

* Article 118 of the Geneva Convention reads:

"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.

"In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.

"In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.

"The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend.

negotiators to reach agreement with the Communists on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war on a humanitarian basis, negotiations were suspended at Panmunjom on October 8, 1952. At that time the U.N. Command made clear that it had exhausted every effort to find a formula to this end, only to have every proposal it put forward summarily rejected by the Communists.*

Accordingly, it stated that its proposals stood and it was prepared to resume negotiations if the Communists desired to accept any of those proposals or would make a constructive proposal of their own.

In the absence of any proposals from the Communist side, General Clark, on February 22, renewed the oft-repeated U.N. proposal that, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, an exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war not await conclusion of an armistice but be carried out immediately.

Somewhat over a month later, the Communists replied in what appeared to be an acceptance of General Clark's proposal. As the Secretary stated Saturday,⁵ it is our hope that arrangements for this exchange can promptly be completed and carried out.

Meanwhile, as stated last October, U.N. Command liaison officers remain available at Panmunjom to receive any constructive proposals or further communications with regard to the armistice negotiations which the Communists wish to bring to our attention. As far as we know here, they have received nothing further since the Communists' letter of March 28. We, of course, welcome any indications that the Communists are now interested in resolving the entire prisoner-of-war question on a humanitarian basis.

LETTER FROM GENERAL CLARK TO THE COMMUNIST COMMANDERS

Press release 163 dated March 31

On March 31 Gen. Mark W. Clark sent to General Kim Il Sung, Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Gen. Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, the following reply to their letter of March 28 concerning the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war in Korea:*

1. I hereby acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of your letter of 28 March, 1953, in reply to my letter of 22 February,⁶ and understand that you are fully prepared in accordance with our proposal to proceed immediately with the re-

* For texts of statements by General Clark and Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., on the suspension of truce talks, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, pp. 600, 601.

⁵ For Secretary Dulles' statement of Mar. 28, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 495.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.

patriation of all seriously sick and wounded captured personnel during the period of hostilities. Accordingly, I propose that a meeting of the liaison groups headed by a General or Flag Officer representative from each side be held at Pan Mun Jom, at your earliest convenience, to make necessary detailed arrangements for the exchange of these captured persons.

2. I share the hope you expressed that a conclusion of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war during the period of hostilities would make more likely a smooth settlement of the entire prisoner of war question. Accordingly I will be prepared to instruct my liaison group as a second order of business to meet with your liaison group to arrange for a resumption of armistice negotiations by our respective delegations. We take it as implicit in your suggestion in this respect that you would be prepared to accept U.N. Command proposals or make some comparable constructive proposal of your own which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of Delegation meetings.

3. I request that you advise me as soon as possible of your decision on my proposal with regard to the time of meeting between the liaison groups of both sides to arrange for the repatriation of all seriously sick and wounded captured persons.

STATEMENT BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, MOLOTOV

Following is the text of a statement by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, as broadcast by the Moscow radio on April 1:

On the 28th of March, a letter of reply was published from Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the Korean People's Army and Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers addressed to General Clark, Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea regarding the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

The letter voices agreement with the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war of both sides and indicates that in this question virtual agreement was reached during the course of the Korean truce talks and that only the interruption of the Panmunjom truce talks prevented this exchange from taking place earlier.

Agreement has also been expressed to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with clauses of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention referring to the period of military operations. At the same time, the letter stresses that such an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war must lead to the unhindered settlement of the entire prisoner-of-war question and thereby to the achievements of an armistice in Korea.

With this aim in view it is proposed immediately to resume talks in Panmunjom. Following this, a statement was made in Peiping by the Premier of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic, Chou En-lai, and in Pyongyang by the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Kim Il Sung.

Both the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic have stated that they agree to the proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and,

as before, express readiness to reach agreement on the immediate settlement of the entire prisoner-of-war question and thereby of ending the war in Korea.

I am authorized to state that the Soviet Government expresses its full solidarity with this noble act of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and has no doubt that this act will find ardent support among peoples throughout the world.

The Soviet Government also expresses confidence that this proposal will be correctly understood by the Government of the United States of America.

The Soviet Government has unswervingly supported all steps directed toward the reaching of a just armistice and the ending of the war in Korea. The beginning for this was laid in the reply of the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, to the request of the Premier of India, Mr. Nehru, as far back as July, 1950.

As is known, the radio broadcast in New York in June, 1951, by the U.S.S.R. representative in the Security Council¹ served as a basis for beginning truce talks in Korea. These truce talks, which first took place in Kaesong and subsequently in Panmunjom, led to agreement on all conditions of the armistice excepting the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war but the truce talks were interrupted by General Clark in October last year, which delayed the conclusion of an armistice.

The Chinese and Korean side have accepted General Clark's proposal that an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war should be made in conformity with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning treatment of prisoners of war.

This Article states: . . .²

This Article of the Geneva Convention refers to the period prior to the armistice, when military operations have not yet been suspended. Since the agreement on the application of this Article has been reached by now and may be signed in the next few days by both sides, no obstacles will be left in the way of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war beginning without further delay.

The aforementioned letter of the Commander in Chief of the Korean People's Army, Kim Il Sung, and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, Gen. Peng Teh-huai, not only expresses consent to General Clark's proposal of Feb. 22 on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, but also proposes resumption of the armistice talks in order to put an end to the war in Korea.

Particular attention must be paid to the fact that the statement of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai on March 30, worked out jointly by the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, proposes not only to exchange the sick and wounded prisoners of war, but also to decide the question on repatriation of prisoners of war as a whole, leading to the conclusion of an agreement on an armistice and the cessation of the war in Korea.

The Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Republic on their side propose: Following the sensible settlement of the question concerning the sick and wounded prisoners of war, to solve the whole question of prisoners of war in order that both sides be guided by the sincere desire to reach an armistice in Korea in the spirit of a mutual compromise.

The question of the repatriation of prisoners of war must, of course, be decided in conformity with the principles of the Geneva Convention on which, naturally, the Soviet Government insisted, as did the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. As is known neither the prolonged talks in Panmunjom, however, nor the repeated discus-

sions of this question at the General Assembly of United Nations, produced any positive results.

Inasmuch as this question remained the only difference between the belligerent sides in Korea presenting an obstacle to an agreement on an armistice, the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, guided by the desire to achieve peace and an end of the war in Korea, took a step toward a final solution of this question.

They proposed that both sides resume talks on the armistice, committing themselves to repatriate, immediately after the cessation of military operations, all prisoners of war in their hands insisting on repatriation, while handing over the rest of the prisoners of war to a neutral state with the object of ensuring a fair solution of the question of their repatriation.

This proposal allows for a fair solution of the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war and for an elimination of the remaining obstacles for the realization of an armistice in Korea.

There can be no doubt that the peoples of the whole world, desiring to put an end to the war in Korea and to promote the strengthening of peace and the security of the peoples in the Far East and all the world, will welcome this proposal with warm sympathy and offer it full support.

The Soviet Government recognizes the entire fairness of this proposal of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, and is prepared to cooperate fully in its realization.

Naturally, the United Nations could do more as regards an armistice in Korea if it were to include legal representatives of China and Korea.

The fact that the Chinese people and the Korean people are deprived of their lawful representation in the United Nations, firstly, undermines the prestige of this organization, and secondly, deprives it of the possibility of assisting as it should in the strengthening of international security and universal peace.

The Soviet Government considers it its duty to recall that the question of the restitution of the rights of the Chinese and Korean peoples in the United Nations is one of the most urgent questions, and that the restitution of the rights of China and Korea in the United Nations, particularly under present conditions, is in the interests of the raising of the prestige and international importance of the United Nations and will promote the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

Visit of Chancellor Adenauer

On April 1 the Department of State announced that the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, and his party will arrive at Washington on April 7. The Chancellor's party will be met at Washington National Airport by Vice President Nixon, Secretary Dulles, and other officials of the Government, including George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense; and Harold M. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security. At 12 noon the Chancellor will meet with President Eisenhower at the White House and at 3 p.m. he will call on Secretary Dulles.

On April 8 the National Press Club will give a luncheon in honor of the Chancellor at the National Press Building; an afternoon meeting with Secretary Dulles will follow. On that evening, Secretary Dulles will give a dinner in honor of the Chancellor.

¹ For an excerpt from the statement made by Jacob A. Malik on June 23, 1951, see *ibid.*, July 9, 1951, p. 45.

² For text of the article quoted by Mr. Molotov, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 495.

On April 9, following a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, the President will give a luncheon in his honor.

On April 10 the Chancellor and his party will depart for San Francisco.

From April 11 to April 18, the Chancellor and party will visit Carmel, Calif., Chicago, New York, Boston, and Ottawa.

Included in Chancellor Adenauer's party are the following persons: Miss Lotte Adenauer, daughter of the Chancellor; Dr. Walter Halstein, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan, Chief, Office of Foreign Trade; Hans Heinrich von Herwarth, Chief of Protocol; Felix von Eckardt, Chief, Press and Information Office; and Dr. Alexander Böker of the Foreign Office.

Planning Board To Assist National Security Council

White House press release dated March 23

The President has been giving attention to strengthening and improving the operations of the National Security Council (Nsc). On several occasions he has stressed the importance which he places upon the effective functioning of the Council. He feels that in these critical times the Council can afford the greatest possible assistance to the President in deciding policy issues affecting the national security.

The President has decided that he expects to have in regular attendance at Council meetings, in addition to himself and the Vice President, the following: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director for Mutual Security, and (when appointed) the Director of Defense Mobilization.

Beside the above Council members, those regularly attending Council meetings as advisers will be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning (C. D. Jackson). For executive and staff functions at Council meetings, there will be in attendance Robert Cutler, administrative assistant to the President, and the Council's executive secretary and deputy executive secretary.

The President has named Mr. Cutler as special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Mr. Cutler will be the principal executive officer of the National Security Council and serve as chairman of its newly established Planning Board.

To bring to Council deliberations a fresh point of view, not burdened with departmental responsibilities, the President plans from time to time to call upon qualified civilians to act as informal consultants to the Council. At present, seven prominent citizens are spending a good part of

the month of March in Washington as civilian consultants. The President believes that this procedure will prove useful to him and to the other Council members.

In order to provide continuous assistance to the Council in its planning operations, the President has established an Nsc Planning Board to take the place of the former Nsc Senior Staff. This Board will be composed of qualified members and advisers from the departments and agencies represented at the Council table. Each person selected for the Planning Board is appointed by the President, on nomination of the chief of the department or agency concerned, and for this purpose will become a special assistant for National Security Affairs. To date the President has appointed the following:

Chairman: Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Treasury Member: Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

Defense Member: Frank O. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense

Mutual Security Member: Frank N. Roberts, Military Adviser, Director for Mutual Security

ODM Member: William Y. Elliott, Office of Director of Defense Mobilization

Joint Chiefs of Staff Adviser: Maj. Gen. John K. Gerhart, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Central Intelligence Agency Adviser: Robert Amory, Jr., Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

Psychological Strategy Board Adviser: George A. Morgan, Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board

A member from the Department of State will be named during the next few days.

The President has authorized additional technical staff assistance for the Council. He also has reappointed James S. Lay, Jr., and S. Everett Gleason as executive secretary and deputy executive secretary, respectively. They will continue to head the permanent staff of the Council.

Burma Asks Discontinuance of U. S. Aid Program

The Foreign Minister of Burma, Sao Hkun Hkio, on March 17 sent the following letter to William Sebald, U.S. Ambassador at Rangoon:

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR, I am to request under Article V of the Economic Cooperation Agreement between our two governments that the Government of the United States of America will accept notice that we do not desire the aid program to continue beyond June 30, 1953.

The Government of the Union of Burma, however, wish to put on record their appreciation and gratitude for the materials and services received under the Economic Cooperation Agreement which are of great help to them in implementing their rehabilitation programs.

Believe me, etc.,

SAO HKUN HKIO.

Department of State Bulletin

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Japan

Press release 170 dated April 2

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Japan was signed on April 2 at Tokyo. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy signed for the United States and Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki signed for Japan. The treaty must be ratified by both Governments before it will become effective. It is expected that the treaty will shortly be submitted to the U.S. Senate with a view to obtaining its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty by this Government.

In article 12 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, Japan declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with each of the Allied Powers of treaties "to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis." As Secretary Dulles observed in his statement at the opening of the San Francisco conference, the Treaty of Peace by itself could do little more in the field of general economic relations than "point the way to a healthy trade relationship and create the opportunity to go in that way." The treaty signed April 2 marks a significant advance in relations between the United States and Japan, for by this treaty the two Governments record their agreement, in completely mutual terms, upon advanced and enlightened principles to govern on an enduring basis the conduct of general economic relations between the two countries.

In common with other treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation entered into by the United States in recent years, the new treaty deals in considerable detail with a wide range of subject matter. In general, each of the two Governments (1) agrees to accord, within its territories, to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to the normal run of commercial and industrial pursuits; (2) affirms its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping; (3) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons, their property, and interests that reflect the most enlightened constitutional principles; and (4) recognizes the need for special attention to the problems of stimulating the flow of private capital investment.

Specifically, the provisions of the treaty fall into eight broad categories: (1) entry, travel, and residence; (2) basic personal freedoms; (3) guarantees for property rights; (4) the conduct and control of business enterprises; (5) taxation; (6) exchange restrictions; (7) the exchange of goods; and (8) navigation. While the new treaty adheres closely to the substantive pattern of other recent treaties, it contains several provisions

that are new to U.S. commercial treaties. Notable among these is the provision establishing, pursuant to authorization given in the new Immigration and Nationality Act, a special category of treaty aliens, who are permitted entry for the purpose of developing the operations of business enterprises in which they have a substantial investment. Another noteworthy new provision is one designed to assure the maintenance of a free market in the field of marine insurance.

Pending the entry into force of the new treaty, general economic relations between the United States and Japan will continue to be governed by article 12 of the Treaty of Peace, which sets forth certain broad rules for the conduct of such relations between the Allied Powers and Japan during an interim period of 4 years. When the new treaty comes into effect, it will supersede these provisions of article 12 as between the two countries.

Technical Cooperation Agreement With Pakistan

Press release 172 dated April 3

The Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State has been informed that a supplementary program agreement for fiscal year 1953 was signed at Karachi April 1 for technical cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. It provides for an American allotment up to \$12,254,000. The Government of Pakistan will bear all rupee costs of joint projects which will at least equal the American costs. The agreement is supplementary to the Point Four Program agreement signed between the two Governments February 2, 1952.¹

At the same time Country Director Ralph Will, and Said Hassam, representing the Government of Pakistan, signed project agreements for the utilization of \$8,437,500 of these funds on specific activities.

The specific agreements are

1. The United States will make available \$437,000 for the continuation of the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program toward which it gave \$2,300,000 of fiscal year 1952 funds. This program is designed to increase the efficiency of agricultural production, improve health and sanitary conditions, expand the production of goods and services at the village level to meet local needs, and to introduce cottage industries to provide off-season employment to raise the level of real income and expand total net gross income.

2. The United States will make available \$3,700,000 for the importation of fertilizer. Increased food production is one of Pakistan's prime

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1952, p. 296.

requirements and its major source is agriculture. Last fiscal year the United States provided \$900,000 towards the purchase of 10,000 tons of fertilizer. The new program will provide the fertilizer to Pakistani farmers to enable them to step up the production of wheat and other essential grains to meet a situation which is causing deep concern to the Pakistan Government.

3. \$100,000 will be furnished by the United States toward the construction of a Water Development Laboratory at Karachi to provide water research services for the entire nation.

4. The United States will supply \$3 million to assist in the construction of a fertilizer factory at Karachi. The entire cost of the factory is estimated at \$13,307,000, exclusive of consultants' fees and ocean freight on materials purchased outside of Pakistan. When completed the factory will produce approximately 50,000 tons of ammonium sulphate annually.

5. \$450,000 will be furnished by the United States, principally in engineering services, toward the construction of a dam across the Bolan River at Sibi in Baluchistan and for the irrigation and reclamation of land in that area. This project also is being assisted by the Colombo plan. The dam will be constructed by Pakistan and will be finished within one year. It will be earth-filled and will have a height of 70 feet and be 600 yards long. It should provide irrigation for about 35,000 acres and the resettlement of 2,500 refugee families.

6. Assistance to the amount of \$750,000 will be provided by the United States for the development of modern fishing facilities in Karachi. The tremendous increase in the population of Karachi, from about 400,000 before partition to the present 1,500,000 has posed an urgent problem of increased food production. The construction of modern facilities for handling fish, motorizing the fishing fleet, and other improvements in the service should result in important increases in the volume of fish and insure safe supplies of this important food item.

In addition to the above project agreements, consultations are under way in Karachi for the formulation of others to round out the entire program as outlined in the general agreement signed April 1.

Control of Shipments to Communist China, North Korea

Discussion With Senator McCarthy

Press release 168 dated April 1

Secretary Dulles and Senator McCarthy had lunch on April 1 at Senator McCarthy's suggestion. They discussed measures for the control of trade with countries of the Communist bloc.

Senator McCarthy told of the informal understanding which certain Greek shipowners had

communicated to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in which they undertook to abstain from certain areas of trade with the Soviet bloc.

The Secretary reviewed the progress recently made by the Department of State in securing the cooperation of foreign nations in accomplishing the policy declared by Congress in the Battle Act "to apply an embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to the countries of the Soviet Bloc." It was noted that cooperation and advice from members of Congress is helpful in the administration of the act. However, that act places on the Administrator of the act (Mr. Stassen) the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the agencies concerned with security controls over exports from other countries. It was pointed out the dangers that would result if congressional committees entered into the field of foreign relations, which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chief Executive.

Senator McCarthy stated that he was aware of these considerations and had no desire or intention to act contrary to them. He said that in the conduct of his committee's investigation facts had been developed which would be useful and for the benefit of the country.

Senator McCarthy further pointed out that neither he nor his committee had made or contemplated making any agreement with any foreign governments or foreign shipping groups, but that as a by-product of the committee's investigation, certain foreign shipping groups had voluntarily agreed among themselves to abstain from participation in the Communist China trade and inter-Soviet bloc trade, a result which both Secretary Dulles and Senator McCarthy felt was in the national interest.

The Secretary thanked the Senator for the information tendered and said that it would be helpful in further negotiations with foreign countries. Senator McCarthy further advised that if in the future similar information would be developed it would be promptly communicated to the proper authorities to the end that the most advantageous use of it would be made.

Department Statement

The following statement was issued by the Department on March 30 in response to queries concerning the action taken by the Greek Government to prevent the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China and North Korea:

On March 23 the Council of Ministers of the Greek Government reached a decision to prohibit all Greek flag vessels from calling at any port in Communist China or North Korea. This decision had the effect of law immediately, although it is subject to ratification by the Greek Parliament. Its effect is binding on all ships of Greek registry.

Other countries which have taken similar action

in compliance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution of May 18, 1951¹ are:

Honduras—December 22, 1950

Liberia—July 23, 1951

Panama—August 18, 1951

Costa Rica—January 26, 1952.

The United Kingdom on March 7, 1953, decided, in addition to the system of controls already in force to prevent the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China and North Korea, to introduce a system of voyage licensing for vessels registered in the United Kingdom and the colonies so that strategic materials from non-British sources could not be carried to China in British ships and to prevent the bunkering in British ports of ships of Soviet bloc or other nationality carrying strategic cargoes to Communist China.

On March 28 the French Government agreed to take the necessary measures to prevent the bunkering in French ports of ships carrying to Communist China cargoes of strategic materials and the transportation by French ships of cargoes of strategic character to ports of Communist China.²

For a considerable period Canada has maintained a strict embargo over shipments of strategic materials to Communist China, and since August 1951 no ships of Canadian registry have been engaged in trade with Communist China.

For its part, the United States on December 3, 1950, brought all shipments to Communist China and North Korea under licensing control.³ On December 8, 1950, an order was issued prohibiting ships of U.S. registry from carrying without prior approval controlled commodities to any Soviet bloc ports, including Communist China and North Korea.⁴ On December 16, 1950, the United States placed under control all Chinese Communist assets within U.S. jurisdiction and also issued an order prohibiting U.S. ships and aircraft from touching at mainland China and North Korean ports and from carrying anywhere in the world goods destined for Communist China.⁵

In all, some 45 countries have indicated, in response to the U.N. China Embargo Resolution, that they are preventing the shipment of strategic commodities to Communist China and North Korea or that they do not produce or trade in the items concerned.

¹ BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 849.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 491.

³ For a complete report on U.S. action, see *ibid.*, July 9, 1951, p. 54.

⁴ Transportation Order T-1, *ibid.*, p. 59.

⁵ Transportation Order T-2, *ibid.*, p. 60. For Department statement on this order and on the blocking of Chinese Communist assets, see *ibid.*, Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1004.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Providing For An Under Secretary of State (For Administration). Report (To accompany S. 243). H. Rept. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 pp.

Thirteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 3, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 210 pp.

Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on the Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. March 2 and 18, 1953. 128 pp.

German Consulate-America House Program. First Intermediate Report of the Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 168, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 pp.

German Consulate-America House Program. Hearing Before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session. February 17, 1953. 86 pp.

Inquiring Into Certain Operations and Conditions in Korea. Adverse Report (To accompany H. Res. 171). H. Rept. 164, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 pp.

World War II International Agreements and Understandings Entered Into During Secret Conferences Concerning Other Peoples. March 12, 1953. Committee Print. 83d Congress, 1st Session. 138 pp.

Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies. Report of the Committee on Government Operations. S. Rept. 80, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 pp.

Proceedings at the Enshrining of The Declaration of Independence, The Constitution of the United States and The Bill of Rights in the Exhibition Hall of the National Archives Building December Fifteenth, Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-two. S. Doc. 13, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 pp.

War Claims Arising Out of World War II. Letter From the War Claims Commission Transmitting the Supplementary Report of the War Claims Commission on War Claims Arising Out of World War II, Pursuant to Section 8 of the War Claims Act of 1948, As Amended, and the Letter of the President, Dated January 16, 1953. H. Doc. 67, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 247 pp.

Joining With the President of the United States in a Declaration Regarding the Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet Union. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on H. J. Res. 200, Joining With the President of the United States in a Declaration Regarding the Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet Union (and Similar Pending Measures). February 26, 1953. 61 pp.

Studying the Palestinian Arab Refugee Situation. Report (to accompany S. Res. 81). S. Rept. 52, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.

Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953. Report (To accompany H. R. 3053). S. Rept. 48, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 pp.

Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting A Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Signed at Paris, on August 28, 1952. S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 pp.

Review of the ECE Economic Survey of Europe

Statement by Miriam Camp¹

Before I begin my comments, I should like to refer to the Executive Secretary's opening remarks concerning the late date of publication of the survey.² As he recognized, it has been impossible in view of the short time the survey has been available to have had it thoroughly considered by the interested branches of my Government, and therefore my comments can only be of a very preliminary character. It may well be that the U.S. representative at Ecosoc will wish to comment further.

This year the Secretariat [of the Economic Commission for Europe] has produced for us, once again, a survey of the economic problems and prospects of Europe which embodies that imaginative approach and statistical energy which we have come almost to take for granted, but for which we must nonetheless remain continually grateful and impressed. The fact that the survey this year presents a broad analysis of developments since the war and outlines comprehensively an independent view of the directions which European policy should take in the future greatly enhances its value.

I should like to say at once that in the very broadest terms, both the diagnosis of the economic problems of Western Europe and the prescriptions offered seem to us to look in the right directions and are presented in ways, and with a wealth of factual information, which, at least for me, have shed new light on the problems with which we are all so concerned. Like its predecessor, but like too few other economic studies, it is lucidly and skillfully written. Having said this and having done so from real conviction and not from mere inaugural politeness, I feel more at liberty to proceed to a few less favorable reactions.

¹ Made on Mar. 16 before the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe at Geneva. Miss Camp, who served as acting head of the U.S. delegation to the ECE meeting, is Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

² *The Economic Survey of Europe Since the War: A Re-appraisal of Problems and Prospects* (U.N. doc. E/ECE/157).

I am sure that the Secretariat is by now inured—indeed, perhaps completely numb—to the comment that it sometimes appears to be aspiring to the position of the economic Cassandra of Europe. Nonetheless, I feel that there is a point of real substance in this general comment, and I feel bound to say, once again, a few words on the subject.

A careful review of the facts and figures to be found in the survey indicates that a rather remarkable amount of progress has been made by the free world in the past 5 years—in increasing production, in bringing inflation under control, in expanding trade, in maintaining a high level of investment, in avoiding any major recessing, in achieving a more equitable distribution of income, in mounting a necessary and substantial defense effort, and in developing units of and institutions for international economic cooperation. In short, an impressive groundwork for continued progress and for an expanding world economy has been established. Yet this is not the impression one receives from the survey, particularly not from a quick reading of the survey.

The economist is, of course, always free to take a broad historical approach to the problems with which he is dealing. Given our limited understanding of economic processes, and given the harsh character of the economic history of recent decades, such an approach must, almost inevitably, highlight the past failures of government policy and emphasize the possibility that such failures will recur.

Different Approach Needed

It seems to me, however, that economists who are closely concerned with analyzing problems of government policy from month to month and year to year, and with appraising the practical alternatives of policy for the future, would do us a greater service if they were to take a somewhat different approach. Past disasters and failures of policy should serve primarily to illuminate decisions

which must be taken in the present. The future might be viewed against less perfectionist standards and with less apparent certainty that the errors of the past will be repeated.

Another general comment which I should like to make concerns the treatment accorded to the Eastern European countries in comparison with that given to the West. The survey's approach to the Eastern European countries is reflected in the statement that "the cloud of difficulties which has arisen in particular industries at various times should not be allowed to obscure the picture of achievement of the Eastern European governments." For the Western European countries, the approach appears to be that the massive achievements since the war should not be allowed to obscure the inadequacies of policy in the past and the major difficulties with which the governments of Western Europe are still faced.

There sometimes seems to be a lack of parallelism in the methods of economic analysis that are applied to the two areas and to the standards against which achievements are treated. Results that are wide of the target tend to be "failures" in Western Europe but only "shortfalls" in Eastern Europe. Social costs, political factors, alternative lines of policy all come in for more scrutiny and comment in those sections of the report that deal with Western Europe, as indeed they do in Western Europe itself. The very availability of an abundance of public discussion and analysis in one area, and its absence in the other, undoubtedly tends to this result.

The Polish delegate³ in his remarks on Saturday made a considerable point of the fact that he felt the Eastern European countries could not and should not be judged by the same standards as are used in judging the countries of the West, and he strongly felt the Secretariat had been wrong to try to do so.

I feel, on the contrary, that they should be commended for trying and encouraged to try even harder in the future. For unless achievements can be tested against the same standards and unless the methods of analysis and the degree of critical judgment applied are the same for all areas dealt with by the survey, the usefulness of any attempt at an all-European economic analysis will be seriously undermined.

Difficulties of Obtaining Data

The chapters on the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe inevitably reflect the familiar inability of even the most energetic and persistent research worker to secure adequate information on developments in this area. The best that it appears to be possible to do, so far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned, is to present an exposition of plans of varying duration, largely accepting at

³ Eugeniusz Jan Milnikiel, Polish Minister to Sweden, who spoke on Mar. 14.

face value data whose significance cannot really be tested. In fact, in the case of the U.S.S.R., it seems to be impossible even to avoid presenting statistical series which are clearly not comparable.

There can, of course, be little doubt that production and investment have risen substantially in the Eastern countries. There can equally be no doubt that we shall never really know the true magnitude of these increases, and that any discrepancies between planned and actual increases will be concealed in those countries, to the best of governmental ability.

From the standpoint of trying to compare economic trends in the East and the West, perhaps the most interesting sections are those concerning living standards and the distribution of incomes in the Eastern countries. It is made quite clear that an increase in living standards plays no part in the immediate policy objectives of the Eastern European governments; and, even though reliable information in this field is as meager as in others, it is equally clear that the Eastern governments have been successful in directing productive resources to industrial and military production at the expense of improved living standards.

One of the most interesting problems with which the Eastern governments appear to be faced is that of preventing increases in workers' productivity from being translated into increases either in money wages or in real wages. This current policy of the Eastern countries might be compared with the contrasting one of wage increases in accord with productivity increases which is being embodied more and more in major American wage contracts.

Reasons for Decline in East-West Trade

The survey also throws light on some of the fundamental reasons for the great decline in trade between Eastern and Western Europe; reasons which were omitted from most of the statements made in the course of the trade discussion the other day. The tables presented show that the volume of exports from Eastern to Western Europe in 1951 was little more than one-fourth as great as in 1938, whereas exports from the West to the East were about one-half as large in volume. Price changes were of course an important factor in the relatively larger decline in exports from the East.

The survey points out one reason for hesitation on the part of the West to increase trade with the East—the fact that useless credits have been accumulated by the West in several Eastern countries because of failure by the latter to provide the volume of exports foreseen in the trade agreements which they negotiated and signed.

However, an analysis of the data presented in the survey indicates a more basic cause for this shrinkage in the exports from Eastern to Western European countries. The most fundamental

cause of the continuing decline of East-West trade is, I believe, to be found in the fact that each of the Eastern European countries is pursuing a policy of autarchy, of economic self-sufficiency to the maximum extent of its ability, and that, where such a policy of individual autarchy is not feasible, every effort is made to buy goods from, and to sell them to, other countries in Eastern Europe rather than the West. Trade among the Eastern countries had increased tenfold since before the war, in contrast with the steep decline in their exports to the West. Each country in Eastern Europe is seeking to develop not only basic industries, but also engineering, transportation equipment, and other such industries, and the area as a whole is pursuing policies clearly designed to insure that, at the earliest possible time, the Soviet world can achieve economic isolation.

Not only is this objective implicit in the material presented in the survey but it is an objective which has been publicly expressed many times by the highest officials of the U.S.S.R. and of the other countries of Eastern Europe. From such statements of policy as the well-known *Bolshevik* article of February 1, 1952, published this last autumn, one cannot escape the conclusion that trade with the West is looked upon as a transitional measure, as a means to end such trade.

Western European Policies

Turning now to those much more informative and critical sections of the survey which deal with the countries of Western Europe, I have already commented on the survey's tendency to concentrate on the inadequacies of Western policies at the expense of giving due weight to the truly major achievements since the war in the expansion of production and trade. This approach is perhaps least happily exemplified in the remark about "the much-advertised conditions in some highly industrialized countries, which by skillful policy or good luck have escaped mass unemployment."

It seems to me wrong to belittle in this way a reduction of unemployment in Northwestern Europe which, according to the survey table, fell from 3.1 million in 1938 to only 800,000 in 1951, or by nearly three-fourths. To allow this achievement to be obscured by the peculiar difficulties of assimilating refugees in Western Germany and by the structural problems of the South, seems to me an unfortunate distortion. It was hardly to be expected that the millions of refugees who came from the East just before the war—or, indeed, the thousands now pouring in from the East—could be easily or quickly absorbed.

These comments are not, of course, intended in any way to question the seriousness of the unemployment problem in Southern Europe and in Western Germany, or the need for remedies on which the survey rightly places so much emphasis.

The gains of Western European countries in expanding production and trade since the war have been as impressive as their success in maintaining high levels of employment. The survey, however, is unquestionably correct in pointing out that a few years ago too much hope was held out that a simple expansion of production and trade would bring a solution to Europe's problems; and that there was too little recognition of the very major changes that were needed in the pattern of production, prices, and trade, and in the efficiency and flexibility of European production. The survey is undoubtedly right also in emphasizing that the countries of Western Europe have been perhaps too generous in their judgments of what they could afford to send without return to associated countries overseas, and too lenient in their views of the increases in living standards at home which were compatible with economic strength over the long term. These were undoubtedly "inadequacies" of policy. They cannot, however, it seems to me, justly be called "failures." And, at least in the West, we may see some merit in the fact that these inadequacies were ones of generosity and of humanity.

Broadly speaking, the survey's conclusions concerning the needed directions of Western European policy point the right way. The judgment that Western European countries must increase production in directions which will expand their dollar earnings in relation to their dollar expenditures is hardly open to debate. Equally unarguable is the need for a more effective allocation and use of the supplies of goods and capital which Western European countries have been sending abroad; and, indeed, in the allocation of investment in Western European countries themselves.

These objectives can certainly be achieved only by some *relative* displacement of American production, whether that production is exported or used at home. If there is any quarrel with the general lines of the survey's analysis and recommendations in this field, it would be that they appear to imply a static level of world trade for some years into the future—a constant amount from which the countries of Western Europe must carve an increased share at the expense of U.S. exports or domestic production rather than an expanding level in which Western Europe gains an increasing share. In the chapter on integration, the survey very rightly stresses that progress toward greater European unification can be expected to be reasonably rapid only in the context of expanding economies. The same consideration surely applies to the problem of finding a lasting solution to Europe's trade difficulties.

I would not wish these comments to be interpreted as an indication that the United States would not welcome more effective European competition in world trade. Indeed, the United States, both through substantial *economic aid* and

through many other programs, has emphasized the need for, and has sought to make a direct contribution to, increased European efficiency and competitiveness.

U.S. Economic Policies

In this general connection, the survey, and a number of speakers, have emphasized the need for action by the U.S. Government on tariffs and related measures which might make it easier for foreign goods to be sold in the American market. This whole problem is, as you know, one that is now receiving the close attention of our new administration. In his first State of the Union message to the Congress,⁴ President Eisenhower called particular attention to the need for a revision in our customs regulations and for an immediate study of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. These questions have also been the subject of increased attention by public groups in the United States. Just recently the Public Advisory Board, composed of distinguished private citizens representing business, agriculture, and labor, and the Council of Economic Development, a prominent business group, have both issued reports advocating sweeping changes in our tariff laws and regulations.⁵

As a final comment on the survey's approach to the achievements of Western Europe in expanding production and trade, I should like to question the appropriateness of the frequency with which the term "stagnation" is used to describe economic developments over the past 18 months. It was, of course, inevitable that the survey's analysis should be based on data extending only through the third quarter of last year. The fact that this third quarter usually shows a sharp seasonal decline, however, together with the marked divergency in trends among the various industries, might, in my opinion, have led the Secretariat to use some more cautious word than "stagnation"—perhaps "leveling off."

The information now available for the fourth quarter, although it presents a somewhat mixed picture, on balance, shows signs of a marked upturn. The index of industrial production for the OEEC countries which stood at 129 in the third quarter of 1952 rose to 145 in the fourth. This, of course, is also a normal seasonal development. Intra-Western European trade rose to a new high and deficits with the United States and Canada were reduced.

The survey's last chapter, that on "Problems of Economic Integration," opens with the gloomy statement that:

The process of international economic disintegration in Europe has been going on, more or less continuously, during the last four decades.

⁴ BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 207.

⁵ For a summary of the former report, see *ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1953, p. 436.

It goes on to say that:

So far there have been no clear signs of a reversal of these trends. Quite apart from the effects of the East-West split, the main tendency in Western Europe has been one towards continued disintegration of the international economy.

The first statement, of course, has very substantial truth in it. The automatic gold standard has, indeed, disappeared, and the universal acceptance by Western governments of the need to maintain high levels of employment and rising living standards has certainly increased the practical difficulties with which governments are faced both in meeting their domestic aims and in seeking an expanding and freer world trade.

The question may be asked, however, whether it would really be better if these new aims of government were to be abandoned. And if the answer to this question is "no," as the survey itself implies, the further question may be asked whether it is not somewhat beside the point to characterize a period in which major new aims and policies have been assumed as one of "continuing disintegration."

As for the statement that "the main tendency in Western Europe has been one toward *continued* disintegration of the international economy," the evidence to the contrary seems to me to deserve rather more attention than it receives. Surely the OEEC, embracing as it does the European Payments Union with its concomitant program of trade liberalization, has been a major factor in arresting the threatened disintegration of the immediate postwar years and in promoting increasing integration of the Western European economy. The establishment of the Coal and Steel Community was a tremendously bold step forward. Indeed, it does seem to me that examination of the evidence in this survey—although it reveals very great difficulties which have made progress less rapid than had been hoped and which will undoubtedly continue to be a brake on as rapid future progress as might be hoped for—leads to the conclusion that the trend in Western Europe over the past 5 years has been toward increasing rather than decreasing economic integration.

The survey's emphasis on the need for developing the underdeveloped areas in Southern Europe is greatly to be welcomed; although the survey perhaps goes a little far in interrelating as closely as it does the problem of further Western European integration in Western Europe and the solution of the problems of the underdeveloped countries in the South.

Particularly questionable is the suggestion that substantial tariff protection is essential to aid these underdeveloped areas of Southern Europe. Surely there are many alternative possibilities which would be considered before embarking on a major new system of tariff protection, which could have so many damaging repercussions in other areas of policy. A full historical appraisal

of the causes of continued poverty in Southern Italy would reveal many causes in addition to, and of more fundamental importance than, lack of tariff protection.

In summing up this section, the survey rightly concludes that "experience suggests the need to realize that the institutional setting in Western Europe necessitates a very empirical approach to the practical problems of international integration." This endorsement of the practical approach is to be welcomed and can well be underlined as a guide to the governments which are striving to make further progress in this field, although with the Dutch delegate, I feel that if real progress is to be made, the empirical approach has to be combined with goals that fire the imagination.

In coming to the end of my statement, I am very aware that the balance has been more on the side of criticism than on praise. Indeed, I am afraid I have yielded to that weakness which seemed to me to have characterized too much of the survey's approach to the problems of Western Europe—the weakness of picking out what seem to me to be the flaws instead of concentrating on the very real and great merits of the survey. As I indicated at the beginning these seem to me to be so great as to command the admiration of all of us. And I should like to close by paying tribute to all those who have worked so hard in producing what is, despite such faults as various of us may choose to mention, a constructive and imaginative analysis of Europe's problems.

Mr. Chairman, I should now like to make one additional remark. During the course of this debate and our earlier debates, numerous charges have been made by the delegates from Eastern Europe concerning U.S. intentions and actions in Western Europe, in Korea, and in other parts of the world.

I have not repeatedly intervened to set the record straight, for two reasons: First, because I did not wish to contribute to the tendency to discuss questions which are not germane to the problems under discussion, and second, because the statements made are believed by no one here except those who deliberately choose to do so in blind disregard for the facts.

The United States is not perfect, nor does it pretend to be. We welcome constructive criticism of our actions and policies such as those made during this debate by the delegates from France, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

However, we totally reject malicious falsehoods and attempts to distort the facts of our support for the United Nations in Korea or of the purposes of our assistance to Western Europe, which have been and continue to be to promote economic well-being and the conditions for peace.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Czechoslovak Subversion Charges Against U.S. Refuted

*Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

THE FACTS ON MSA AID

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 23

Once again, let me say to the representatives of the Communist bloc—I have said it many times before and I guess I will go on saying it quite a few times again—that no valid indictment against the United States can ever be based on newspaper clippings and remarks of individual legislators. I realize that if this truth were taken to heart, it would eliminate 90 percent of the Communist attacks.

But it is a truth just the same. We have a free press in America; newspapers, magazines say what they want to say, and disagree with each other. The writer disagrees with the editor and the editor disagrees with the owner. We have free speech in America. We have free speech in the House of Representatives. We have free speech in the U.S. Senate, and it is seldom, if ever, that statements are made there that are made with official authority. It is always easy to know what the U.S. Government thinks by what its officials say on their official authority.

The Czech representative [Vaclav David, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister] says that the U.S. is engaged in subversion, which of course is completely untrue. His speech reminds me a little bit of the statement that used to be made by a cynical political boss who existed for a while here and who said this: "Blame everything, concede nothing, and if defeated, allege fraud." Well, he didn't last very long either.

There were many surprising statements in the speech of the Czech representative. One of them

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Mar. 23 and Mar. 25 during debate on the Czechoslovak item entitled: "Interference of the United States of America in the Internal Affairs of Other States as Manifested by the Organization on the Part of the Government of the United States of America of Subversive and Espionage Activities Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, the Czechoslovak Republic, and Other People's Democracies."

was that the American soldiers wanted to stay in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that all American soldiers have in common—it is a burning desire to get home. I have never yet met one who did not want to come home as soon as he could. The Czech representative spoke about the U.S. abusing its forces on the border of Czechoslovakia. And yet the world remembers well because it happened on the 10th of March, when two Mig planes of the Czechoslovak air force shot down an American plane.² The weather was good that day and he knew exactly where he was and he was directly over the American Zone of Germany. Two days later, a British bomber was shot down and six British airmen were killed, for which we express our heartfelt sympathy.

The Coup d'État in Czechoslovakia

Mr. Chairman, if we consider the question of subversion, the case of Czechoslovakia itself is a most flagrant case in point.

Remember that on February 19, 1948, the small free state of Czechoslovakia was having a Cabinet crisis which, had it been settled legally, would have reduced Communist strength in the Government. Suddenly, there appeared a series of reports carefully planted by Soviet agents that the Red army was about to invade Czechoslovakia. Tension was further increased by the sudden arrival in Prague of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin, accompanied by six Soviet generals, the same Mr. Zorin who is our colleague here today representing the Soviet Union at the United Nations. If I make any mistake in describing what happened next I hope he will correct me.

Mr. Zorin's arrival in Prague was accompanied by the appearance of many heavily armed Communist police who, under the Communist Minister of the Interior, began to patrol the streets and

² BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1953, p. 474.

search the headquarters of all opposition political parties. They were soon joined by regiments of Communist militia who marched in military formations led by Soviet-trained leaders and carrying Soviet flags.

The next day, February 20, the country was shaken by more rumors of imminent Soviet invasion. Mr. Zorin and his generals were still in Prague and the Communist police militia had proclaimed virtual martial law.

The Kremlin took the next step in converting Czechoslovakia into a puppet state by calling to arms all members of its so-called Czechoslovak "action committees." Planted in every walk of life, they constituted a fifth column in every business organization, factory, and public service—even in the opposition political parties.

On February 21 members of this Communist fifth column seized control of the police, civil service, trade unions, business firms, factories, public utilities, and banks. Following a preconceived, well organized plan, they then dismissed chairmen, directors, and other key figures and put in their own men. By the end of the day all the features of a Soviet police state had appeared in what had been a democratic country; control of broadcasting facilities, elimination of all non-Communist newspaper editors, suppression of non-Communist periodicals and complete censorship. All non-Communist political parties had been eliminated and many of their officials had been arrested.

Thus, in 3 days the country had been taken over. Four days later, on February 25, aged President Benes was forced to sign a Cabinet list which set up a government consisting entirely of Communists and Communist dupes.

What happened after that?

Jan Masaryk was inexplicably driven to his death. Clementis was hanged. Mr. Slansky is dead. But, both Mr. Slansky and Mr. Gottwald left us a testament on subversion when they boasted that they had gone to Moscow to learn "how to wring the neck of the bourgeoisie" in their native country.

This Czechoslovak coup d'état is certainly one of the most glaring examples of subversion in modern times. With this record hung around their necks, the present rulers of Czechoslovakia, who introduced this resolution criticizing the United States, do not come into court with clean hands. Their charges, therefore, are not to be believed.

They charge that in 1951 and again in 1952 the United States appropriated \$100,000,000 for alleged espionage, terrorism, and recruitment of refugees into military formations—all of this, according to the charge, for the purpose of subverting the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and other so-called "Peoples Democracies" in Eastern Europe and the Far East.

Aid to Escapees

The nations of the world are entitled to the facts and here they are:

In 1951, \$100,000,000 was authorized under section 101 of the Mutual Security Act. No further sums were authorized under this section in 1952.

The \$100,000,000 is being spent as follows: \$95,700,000 is going for regular military and economic aid—a part of the larger sums the United States is now spending under the Mutual Security Act and has previously spent under the Marshall plan to help the free nations to stay free. Before the subversion of the free State of Czechoslovakia, she, too, wanted to get this aid. But the Kremlin said "no," because it knew this assistance was designed to strengthen collective security against aggression—to stop future Koreas and future Czechoslovakias before they start.

The remaining \$4,300,000 is being spent to help escapees from Iron Curtain countries. The Czech delegate is evidently baffled because there are no escapees going into the Iron Curtain countries. All the escapees are coming out. I wonder why?

An escapee is a person who has escaped from the Soviet-dominated world during the last 5 years, and has not been granted citizenship in his country of refuge. He thus differs from the millions of Germans and the hundreds of thousands of Turks and Greeks who fled Soviet-dominated areas in recent years and who have since been granted citizenship in Western Germany, Turkey, and Greece. Unlike them, the person we are helping has literally no place in this world.

But he yearns for a freedom which has been denied him—freedom to speak, to write, to vote, to worship as he pleases and build his life in his own way. He also yearns for freedom from speed-ups, labor disciplines, the internal passports which make Soviet life a hell for the ordinary person, and freedom from the threat of the secret police, the mass deportation, and the forced labor camp.

This person—this stateless man—has given up his home, his possessions, his friends, and often his family. Heroically, he has cracked the Iron Curtain, even though that curtain is constantly being strengthened. Because, as life becomes harder and harder behind the Iron Curtain, more and more people want to escape. More armed guards may be watching from observation towers, vicious dogs may be patrolling the frontiers. Yet people continually get through.

Flights to Freedom

For example:

Here are three Czechs who climbed a 200-meter airshaft to escape from a coal mine near Kladno, Czechoslovakia, and fled to West Germany on June 21, 1950. They escaped because they were condemned to forced labor for anti-Communist activities before the Czech coup d'état.

Here is Vladimir Drazan, another Czech escapee, who was wounded by an exploding mine while climbing barbed wire entanglements, and who swam the Morava River under fire from Communist guards and arrived safely on the Austrian side on December 14, 1952. He escaped because of depressed living conditions in Communist Czechoslovakia.

Here are Mr. and Mrs. Steven Kantor, a Hungarian couple who hid for 4 days in an empty wine vat in a boxcar on a sealed train from Budapest to Switzerland. They broke out in Linz, Austria, on March 19, 1952. They escaped because their repair shop was nationalized without compensation and they were denied employment because of their anti-Communist record.

Here are a Hungarian farmer, wife, and three small children who reached the Western Zone of Austria on October 29, 1952, after swimming a river and fleeing clear across Hungary from the Rumanian border. They escaped because it was impossible to fulfill unreasonable crop quotas and they were forced to sell livestock to pay confiscatory taxes.

Here is a Charles University student from Prague accompanied by his fiancée, who took poison when apprehended by East German police at the West Berlin border. He was rescued by the West German border patrol and was cured in a West Berlin hospital in August 1952. He escaped because he was accused of "cosmopolitanism"—isn't that a terrible crime?—and unable to continue his studies.

Here is a young foundry worker with his wife and small child who crossed the Hungarian-Austrian border on February 8, 1953, after evading man-and-dog patrols, passing over mined areas, and cutting through barbed-wire barriers. This family escaped because it was impossible to live in Hungary and bring up their child in a democratic manner.

These are a few examples.

Escapee Program Set Up

There are more than 15,000 such escapees in West Germany, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece and Turkey, and they continue to come in at the rate of several hundred a month. All of them are not young men—there are wives, small children, unmarried girls, and elderly people.

When they arrive, they are destitute—unlike the millions of refugees from East Germany who have gone to West Germany and who are fleeing from tyranny to freedom at the rate of 30,000 a month. These stateless persons are entirely without citizenship rights, and their very presence adds to the great burdens of the countries of free Europe.

To help these people, to keep hope in the hearts of others, the United States authorized the sum of \$4,300,000 to be used to set up an escapee pro-

gram in March 1952.³ It is a pretty inhuman heart that is not touched by the need and by the courage—which makes \$4,300,000 appear small enough.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that Congressman Kersten is to be commended for having done a good deed.⁴

The money is used to help the host countries provide reception and living quarters, food, clothing, medical care, help in their search for visas, vocational training, and employment and emigration advice for emigration is strongly encouraged.

The program which began last March had by August helped 122 escapees to leave Europe. By the end of August, almost 700 were on their way overseas. As of March 1, 1953, a total of 2,483 escapees had been settled in 21 non-European countries. More than another thousand had been accepted by other nations.

News of this program has spread behind the Iron Curtain. More and more people are escaping from tyranny. Those who choose freedom in the future may even include some of the highest officials.

Mr. Chairman, if there is one trait which sets man above the animals, it is spiritual courage. These people show a tough, unbeatable type of courage which deserves our commendation and our help.

This Czech resolution should be emphatically rejected.

SOVIET POLICY OF AGGRESSIVE INTERVENTION

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 23

I would just like for a few minutes to point out a few of the inaccuracies and lacunae in the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union [Andrei Gromyko].

He spoke of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement concerning nonintervention in the affairs of one state by another. I would like to point out that for all practical purposes the Soviet Government made a dead letter of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement shortly after it was signed. Shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations, President Roosevelt instructed our Ambassador in Moscow to make all protests against the violations of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement by the Soviet Union. When in 1935, the Comintern met in Moscow and instructed the American Communist Party to use Trojan horse tactics against the American Government, the President sent a strong protest to the Soviet Government. He said

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 602.

⁴ Rep. Charles J. Kersten is the author of the amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 that authorizes expenditure of \$100,000,000 to assist "selected persons who are residing in or escapees from" the Soviet dominated areas. He was one of several U.S. leaders attacked by the Czechoslovak representative in his statement of Mar. 23.

the United States anticipated the most serious consequences if the Soviet Government refused to prevent further acts in disregard of the solemn pledge given by it to the United States.

Hardly a month after the Soviet regime seized power in 1917, all allied and neutral missions in Petrograd received this circular note from the Soviet leaders: ". . . the Soviet Government considers necessary diplomatic relations not only with governments but also with the revolutionary socialist parties which are striving for the overthrow of existing governments." . . .⁵

Since the end of the war, the Soviet Government has persistently followed a policy of aggressive intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations and peoples. Upon the very countries listed in the complaint before this Committee, the Soviet Union has imposed dictatorial Communist regimes. The profoundest feelings for family and country of peoples of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary have been deliberately trampled upon.

Only a short time ago, the Yugoslav delegation presented to the Assembly a case history of Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign nation—in this instance, Yugoslavia. When the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the Cominform, the highest leaders of the Soviet State then demanded that the Yugoslav people overthrow the Yugoslav Government.

Nor will the world ever forget the most outstanding case of intervention of all—the Communist attack upon the Republic of Korea supported by Soviet equipment, training, and propaganda. I do not think that ought to be left out.

Now, Mr. Chairman, a sarcastic reference was made by the representative of the Soviet Union to the Statue of Liberty, saying that the quotation which is written on it should be changed so that instead of being words of welcome as they now are, there be some expression to the effect that all those within the United States should abandon hope. Well, I think the best answer to that is to see how many people who are now in the United States want to leave. Actions, you know, speak a good deal louder than words in these cases. And I repeat my observation of this morning that a lot of people want to come out all the time from behind the Iron Curtain, but no people from outside want to go in.

The representative of the Soviet Union asked us to demonstrate a talent for peaceful occupations. Well, only a few weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I was sitting right over at a meeting of the Technical Assistance Conference and I pledged my Government, I think the sum was \$14 million,⁶ and

⁵ See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia*, Vol. I, p. 303 for the full text of this communication, which was sent on Dec. 14, 1917, by the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Ambassador at Petrograd.

⁶ BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 384.

other nations pledged other sums to drain the swamps, to irrigate the deserts, to wipe out disease, to increase the food supply, to make life worth living for people, to make peace worth struggling for, to bind up the wounds of the world. And as I looked around, to my amazement there was no one in the seat of the Soviet Union, there was no one in the seat of the Ukrainian S.S.R., there was no one in the seat of the Byelorussian S.S.R., there was no one in the seat allocated to Poland, and no one in the seat allocated to Czechoslovakia. Now, there is a case of deeds, of doing something to help people.

Now, the representative of the Soviet Union made a number of quotations from various prominent Americans and he rested a good part of his case on that. With all due respect, that part of his case was rested on sand. One of the Congressmen to whom he referred as one who had violently opposed the Soviet Union during the war was, to the best of my knowledge, not in Congress during the war. He was elected in 1946. Mr. Stassen, whom he quoted, was not in public office at all at the time the quotation was made. I think he was President of the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Dewey is a Governor, and he was speaking as a private citizen. The State of New York, great as it is, has no foreign relations, as I am sure its able and distinguished Governor would be the first to admit. Mr. Dulles, who was quoted, was not in public office at the time that statement was made. Senator Wiley, Senator Mundt, and Senator Taft, who are all distinguished men, were not speaking officially when they made the utterances quoted by the representative of the Soviet Union, and they have no claim to be doing so. In fact, when you analyze the list of American political figures who were quoted by the representative of the Soviet Union, not one was speaking for the U.S. Government.

Now, that is a fact worth noting as indicating the authority underlying those quotations. I will try once again to explain to the representative of the Soviet Union that we have 435 representatives in the House of Representatives; we have 96 Senators. They are all individuals, every one of them. They often disagree with each other. We have free speech and free press in America, and free speech means much speech, and we have much speech here in this country in case nobody knew it. And the practitioners of free speech often try to get into the free press. That may happen in other countries where we have both free speech and free press. Specific propositions may at any given moment be debatable but they spring from a belief in man being superior to the state and they spring from a hatred of aggression.

Under our system of government, the Executive speaks for the United States in foreign affairs. Now, let that be understood. Congress represents the outside check, the independent audit, the capacity of the free people to judge its own govern-

ment—an institution, by the way, which is a great source of national strength and an unknown feature of life, I gather, in the Soviet Union.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the representative of the Soviet Union referred to a bill which I sponsored when I was a Senator, and which provided for the enlistment of stateless young anti-Communist Slavs in the U.S. Army. Well, now, I see no reason at all for me to apologize for having sponsored that legislation. It provided that these young men would come into the American Army at American wages and under American living conditions with American citizenship to follow; to be mixed right in with American soldiers and have an equal chance to go to officer candidate school and to be promoted. Contrast that with the action of the Soviet Union in flagrantly impelling others to fight its battles for it—the North Koreans and the Chinese. Now, these people who are fighting the battles for the Soviet Union have been treated as second-rate satellites. We, on the other hand, have invited others to help us resist aggression on an equal basis and as volunteers. There is all the difference in the world between master and slave on the one hand and mutual comradeship on the other.

THE SUPERSENSITIVE OUTLOOK OF SOVIET LEADERS

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 25

We face the charges of the Czech delegation that the U.S. program of assistance to escapees, initiated under section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act, is an act of aggression.

We contend that far from there being anything illegal about our helping these homeless people, this is a project which is humane and, being illuminated by the spirit of the Charter, deserves general commendation. The program of helping escapees is part of an entire program of helping to keep the free world free. We are forced to adopt these programs because of the actions of the Soviet Union. If people were not made unhappy by the Soviet Union, they would not feel the desperate urge to escape and there would therefore be no need to help them.

If small states like Czechoslovakia were not subverted by the Soviet Union there would be no need to have a program of protection against further subversion. And if shooting wars were not aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, as in Korea, there would be no need for a program of military action.

It is the Soviets—and not we in the United States, or we in the United Nations—who started these things.

We aren't the ones who force people to leave the Iron Curtain; they want to leave. We aren't the ones who are subverting countries and sponsoring aggressive war.

We in the United States actually embarked on a headlong disarmament at the end of World War II, but the confidence which American authorities had at that time in our recent ally now appears to have been a major miscalculation because, while we disarmed, the Soviet Union remained armed to the teeth.

We asked nothing more than to live in peace, but the Soviets have forced us to take these necessary actions to prevent all human rights from being wiped out and to frustrate the establishment of an iron dictatorship throughout the world.

If the Kremlin leaders are really looking for the people who are subverting life behind the Iron Curtain, they should look at themselves—at their laws, their decrees, their practices of oppression. They should look at the Lenin-Stalinist doctrine on which they have impaled nearly half the world. That doctrine is the centrifugal force which drives people out through the Iron Curtain to freedom. It is also the force which sends others out beyond the curtain—aggressive armies, reaching out in Korea, in southeast Asia, threatening central and western Europe in an imperialistic design to enfold still more millions into the Soviet prison.

The Mutual Security Act does two things: It gives asylum to the one group—the escapees; and it is designed to halt the other group—the armies of Soviet aggression.

Ninety-five percent of the \$100 million authorized under the Kersten amendment is going to nations of the free world as an integral part of the larger sum which helps these people build their ramparts against aggression. The other five percent goes to assist those who escape from behind the Iron Curtain. The hypersensitive Soviet leaders regard both parts of this program as aggressive. Well, they have no aggressive potentiality at all.

Mr. Chairman, they do so because of the super-sensitive outlook which leads them to imagine threats to their position. And that is why they consider it necessary and are willing to shoot down an unarmed foreign aircraft, or lash their people with forced collectivization, or sign a pact with Hitler—regardless of the unfavorable repercussions. To be sure, they are sensitive to these repercussions for such actions weaken the hoped-for attraction of their claims to be the champions of peace and humanity. But they are willing to expose this vulnerability in the struggle of ideas in order to protect what they consider to be their power interests. "Let the enemy consider us nasty people," says a *Pravda* article. "From the mouths of the enemy this is praise."

How Tyrannical Power is Protected

The Soviets go about protecting the sources of this tyrannical power by, first, preventing Soviet citizens from communicating with the outside world except through controlled means. The Soviet Government prohibits them from traveling

abroad except on official missions; contains them within the Soviet Union by the most elaborate border controls of any state in the world; provides in the criminal code that their families be punished if they should flee; prohibits uncensored communications to other countries; bars Soviet citizens married to foreigners from leaving the U.S.S.R.; discourages communication with foreigners in the U.S.S.R. by the State Secrets Act that encompasses wide areas of normally public information and by decrees that prohibit Soviet officials from talking with foreigners unless specifically authorized. It also quarantines Soviet occupation troops in foreign areas and prohibits fraternization with the local population.

Next, the Soviet Government prevents foreigners from viewing the Soviet Union freely. Only four types of non-Communist foreigners are permitted to enter: diplomats, newspapermen, fur buyers, and similar businessmen, and members of specially invited delegations. Each group is closely restricted. More than 80 percent of Soviet territory is closed to foreign diplomats. Their movements within Moscow are subjected to various harassments, and their work is publicly described as "espionage." The artificially high exchange rate for the ruble discourages some countries from keeping diplomatic missions in the U.S.S.R. Newspapermen are confined largely to the city of Moscow, restricted mainly to reporting what appears in the Soviet press, subjected to censorship, and constantly faced with the threat of expulsion. They no longer are given re-entry permits before departing from the U.S.S.R. At present, there are only six non-Communist correspondents and applications of other newspapermen for entry have been ignored. Businessmen are largely confined to the Leningrad fur auctions. Selected foreign delegations are carefully shepherded on prearranged tours. Meanwhile, the Soviet Government reveals only the barest information about itself. It refuses to publish statistics on almost all aspects of Soviet life; what it does reveal is vague and often meaningless.

These various measures are designed to block the world from seeing Soviet life as it really is. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union through its own propaganda activities and those of its foreign Communist and fellow-traveling supporters seeks, in an unending campaign, to portray Soviet reality in glowing terms and at the same time to keep up a constant and vigorous exposure of unsatisfactory conditions in non-Communist countries.

The immense scope of Moscow's preventive measures and the intensity of its propaganda efforts provide striking evidence of how touchy the Soviet leaders are where foreign scrutiny is concerned. One of the few times that the worth of an individual is recognized by the Soviet Government is when he flees the country, as has been demonstrated by Soviet willingness to accept the risks involved in murdering or kidnaping es-

capees. The Soviet Consul General in New York, for example, attempted in 1948 the kidnaping of a Soviet school teacher unwilling to return to the U.S.S.R. The brutal abduction in Berlin last summer of Dr. Walter Linse by East German authorities⁷ was a sharp reminder that kidnappings have become an almost routine Communist practice along the Soviet frontiers of Germany and Austria. By their repeated evasion of requests for help in recovering this eminent member of the Committee of Free Jurists, the Soviet authorities only show their fear of permitting free men to stay free. Such incidents as the Linse case throw light on Communist unwillingness to allow prisoners of war a freedom of choice with regard to repatriation.

From the Kremlin's point of view, Communist troops captured in the course of their imperialist adventures cannot be permitted to choose whether to return home or to stay outside the Iron Curtain, for some of them might choose freedom. But the same Communist logic requires the Kremlin to deny to foreign soldiers and civilians alike held captive in the Soviet Empire the right to go home. Among these, as we have heard, are 3,000 Greek soldiers and many thousand Greek children, together with many thousands of Austrians, and even thousands of satellite nationals. In addition, we have reports of 63,000 Italians and over 300,000 Japanese. There are well substantiated reports of at least 98,000 German soldiers and 750,000 German civilians in the Soviet Union; 8,243 German civilians held captive in Czechoslovakia; and 11,550 German civilians in Poland, 3,240 of whom are children far from home and family. All of these people, except for those mercifully dead, are regarded by the Kremlin as a permanent increment to the imprisoned millions of the Soviet Empire. These are facts, gentlemen.

The Kremlin cannot admit that any person, native or foreign, would, if given the choice, select freedom as against Soviet tyranny. Thus it is that the Kremlin charges "aggression" when aid is given to Soviet and satellite citizens who have chosen freedom and pierced the Iron Curtain. Thus it is that the Kremlin must launch purges, must fabricate tales of subversion, and must stage "show" trials about "defectors" and "traitors" in order to account for those who choose freedom, or merely in order to liquidate those pitiful servitors of tyranny, like Slansky, who have fallen into disfavor.

Mr. Chairman, I do not for the time being propose to dwell on that special feature of Soviet tyranny—the persecution of Christians, Moslems, and Jews—which adds further impetus to the flow of escapees from the Soviet orbit.

Nor, Mr. Chairman, do I propose to speak in detail about Soviet persecution of non-Russian

⁷ For an account of Dr. Linse's kidnaping, see *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 823.

ethnic groups. There are, however, two aspects of Soviet ethnic persecution that I think it appropriate to refer to at the present time.

Soviet Ethnic Persecution

The full facts about the first of these were documented only within the past year although the event took place in Poland at the outset of World War II. This event was the Katyn massacre in which more than 4,000 Polish army officers—the flower of the Polish nation—were ruthlessly slaughtered.

These gallant Polish officers had committed two offenses which led to their death: The first was the defense of their homeland against the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939; the second was falling captive to the advancing Red army. Within a few months after their capture sudden silence fell and their fate was unknown until, in 1943, Nazi Germany proclaimed to the world the discovery of the bodies of thousands of Poles—lying in mass graves and shot through the back of the head—in Katyn Forest near Smolensk in the Soviet Union.

To a world familiar with Nazi atrocities and with the Nazi technique of attacking others for their own crimes, credence was not easily put in Nazi charges that the Katyn massacre was the handiwork of Soviet agents. The crime was typical of the Hitlerite pattern, so that at first it was uncertain whether those who died at Katyn were not but added names on the endless roster of the victims of Nazi tyranny.

But the lingering doubts as to the real facts provoked demands for fresh inquiry. This was particularly true here in the United States where many millions of citizens of Polish ancestry felt a deep sense of personal identification with those killed at Katyn. And so it was that in 1951 the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress provided for the establishment of a select committee to conduct an investigation and study of the facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn massacre.

I will not attempt to detail here the gruesome facts disclosed by the select committee. These facts are now known to each government represented here, since the findings of the select committee were circulated to each permanent representative.* Suffice it to say that the select committee's investigation disclosed that responsibility for the massacre lay with the Soviet Government's infamous Nkvd. The committee's findings are of direct and deep concern to all states pledged to the furtherance of Charter principles. The people of the United Nations will measure these facts against their determination, expressed in the Preamble of the Charter, "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person."

Mr. Chairman, another aspect of Soviet tyranny

* *Ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1953, p. 322.

over non-Russian groups is illustrated by Soviet colonial practices in Soviet Central Asia. Moscow's haste to exploit as well as consolidate its grip on the vast wealth of this region has meant the influx of thousands of Slav colonists to a point where, in some areas, they outnumber the local population. And while an apparent effort has been made to give prestige positions to selected local representatives, the ruling managers and the white collar class remain predominantly Slav. For example, the percentage of natives employed in some eight local ministries of food and industry in Kazakhstan in 1948 varied from 2 to a maximum of 14 percent. In Kirghistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan a loss of interest in industrial positions has been reported by the Soviet press due to the lack of opportunity for advancement.

Only recently, I read an article by Dr. Riaz Ali Shah entitled "Islam is Dying in the Soviet Union." Dr. Riaz is the distinguished Pakistani tuberculosis specialist and head of the Punjab Medical Association who visited South Central Asia last spring on the invitation of the Soviet Government. In Tashkent, he reports "the better dressed men, women and children were usually Western Russians. Although there were a number of Uzbeks in the governmental posts, the Russians outnumbered them by a wide margin." Regarding medical training in Tashkent, Riaz said: "In the morning I visited the medical college and hospital. Sixty percent of the students and the majority of the staff were Western Russians." In Alma Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, S.S.R., he found that 60 percent of the students and 60 percent of the persons in responsible jobs were Western Russians who had settled there. And here again he observed that the better dressed and fed children and adults were, as a rule, Western Russians.

When we hear reports about the immense Russian mission in Peiping and the way in which subjects of the Soviet Union are infiltrating in all the Chinese Communist bureaus, we wonder how long it will be before there, too, all the best jobs are taken by the foreign Russian invader, leaving the Chinese to a fate which can only equal that of the earliest days of colonialism.

Mr. Chairman, within this brief space I have tried to outline the skeleton of Soviet tyranny in order that we may best comprehend the forces which impel thousands of escapees to leave their homes and risk their lives in order to reach freedom beyond the Iron Curtain.

We may well ask how long the men in the Kremlin propose to perpetuate this vast and systematized oppression. We seek no hasty answer, for the question is momentous. But the world deserves a reply. Perhaps Mr. Vyshinsky, when he returns to our midst, can bring new word from the Kremlin.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, let me, on behalf of my fellow countrymen, ask the Soviet delegation

certain specific questions: What plans does the Kremlin's Czechoslovak puppet have for William Oatis, a courageous American newspaperman who still languishes in prison?

Further, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my fellow-countrymen, let me ask the Soviet delegation whether it knows what fate the Peiping regime has in store for the hundred-odd Americans in Communist China? This too is a solemn question, for the U.S. Government is informed that 5 of these Americans have already died as the result of maltreatment by the Peiping regime. At least 28 of the Americans in Communist China are imprisoned, 4 more are under house arrest, and on March 21 of this year, 3 more Americans were abducted by Chinese Communists from a yacht off Hongkong.

Mr. Chairman, these matters are of profound and tragic importance to the people of the United States. We would like answers to these questions.

Mr. Chairman, I now wish to direct my attention to the draft resolution which is before us.

For the question before this Assembly is not the catalog of gossip and libel presented by Mr. David, Mr. Gromyko, and their friends. The parliamentary question, and the essential question, which this Assembly must decide is whether the United States, by assisting escapees from the "people's democracies" is, and I quote from paragraph one of the draft resolution, engaging in "acts of aggression" and "interference in the internal affairs of other states."

Aid Can Stop When Escapees Stop Coming

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the only aspect of the escapee program which merits condemnation is the fact that the world is today so organized that there are escapees. The free peoples of the world can hardly do too much for these victims of Soviet tyranny.

Our aid to escapees can only stop when escapees stop coming—when millions of men and women, now trapped behind the Iron Curtain, need no longer look elsewhere for freedom. A problem like this is not solved by tightening border controls and intensifying purges. When national aspirations are subverted, when human rights are suppressed, pressure builds up to the boiling point. One outcome of this pressure is a flow of escapees. And this flow will not stop until the Soviet leaders permit peoples under their sway to live their own lives in their own way.

So long as escapees continue to come, the duty to assist them is a matter of common humanity for the United States and the rest of the free world. It is also a duty imposed on us by the Charter. For, in essence, the U.N. Charter is a Charter of hope and freedom. It is a Charter of emancipation from religious and civil persecution, from poverty and disease, and from the even more hideous scourges of conquest and despotism.

It is a magnet drawing vast populations who see in it the expression of their hope to live their own lives in well-being and freedom.

Mr. Chairman, we want to make this magnet irresistible, strongly charging it with our support and strength.

Our mutual security program will stop when the threat of aggression—not only for us, but for all the free world—is lifted. The United States, like all the free world, prefers peaceful settlements to a dangerous and burdensome armaments race. We do not enjoy that. We long for the day of honest negotiations, which my Government asked for in this Committee last week. We will meet the Soviet Union half-way at any time.

Progress Toward Universal Equal Suffrage

*Statement by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn
U.S. Representative on the Commission
on the Status of Women¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 23

We meet this year with a great sense of achievement because the General Assembly has opened for signature the Convention on the Political Rights of Women recommended by this body over the last 3 years. The action clauses of this convention, which provide that women shall vote and hold public office on equal terms with men, without any discrimination, set a standard for legislation in every country in the world. During discussion of the need for this convention, the point was made that in some countries proposals to grant suffrage to women had been confused by party antagonism. It was felt that a convention proposed by the United Nations could be considered in any country on its merits. The convention can therefore open the way to progress in countries which have not yet granted women the right to vote.

Each year shows progress. Since we last met, Lebanon, Bolivia, Greece, Pakistan, and Mexico have made important extensions of suffrage to women. The grant in Lebanon is equal and complete, and I hope the representative of Lebanon in this Commission will tell us about it. Since Mrs. Ledon of Mexico is also here, as the representative of the Inter-American Commission of Women, perhaps she will tell us of the new grant there. The women in Bolivia and Greece had previously been granted the right to vote in local elections, and the new grants expand their rights to cover all elections.

The Secretary-General's memorandum, document A/2145, is especially impressive this year because it includes the date on which women were originally granted suffrage in each country. This

¹ Made before the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women on Mar. 23.

addition has involved much research, evidenced by the detail in the footnotes. The fine quality of this work deserves commendation. The dates of suffrage grants will help governments, for they show how long women have exercised the franchise in each country and where experience has been gained which may be applicable to their own situation.

I have only one suggestion of importance in regard to this memorandum. Insofar as possible, the United States would like to see the various lists as complete as possible. For some reason Spain has been omitted, and also Laos and Cambodia.

It might help if some standard list were used in this document, possibly the members of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Information on the laws of all countries can usually be obtained from authoritative sources, so that it should not be necessary to send out special inquiries to governments on this matter.

How the U.N. Can Help

Because one of our objectives has been achieved—namely a convention on political rights—this is a good time to take stock of our situation and consider what we need to do in the year or two ahead. There are today still more than 15 countries in which women lack the vote, and almost all of them are members of the United Nations. The provision of equal suffrage in some of these countries will involve real problems, problems of education and customs as well as leadership. There are various ways in which the United Nations may be able to help these governments, and it is our responsibility to think through their particular needs and make recommendations on how to meet them.

One possibility of aid will be some evaluation of the effect of progressive grants. The Secretary-General's memorandum provides some interesting history on this point. In some of the countries where women voted early, such as New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, gains were made piecemeal—first in certain states and provinces, and then pushed on from these geographical subdivisions toward national suffrage. Some suffrage grants have been made on a nationwide basis, but have been limited at the beginning to local elections. In some countries women have been subject to certain educational or other qualifications not required of men. My immediate observation is that where suffrage grants were made first in certain sections of a country, women have eventually achieved rights throughout the nation. It also seems to be true that where women have first been granted the right to vote in local elections, there is a tendency to extend this right to include all elections. I am not so clear of the effect of distinctions based on educational achievements. An analysis by the Secretary-General of these

variations in procedure might help women and their governments decide whether limited grants are useful, and if so on what basis. We would like to see such an analysis prepared by the Secretary-General for our study next year.

There is another aspect of suffrage which does not show in these memorandums but on which we should have information, especially if the grants of suffrage are on a restricted basis. That is whether elections have been held in which women have actually voted. In some countries no elections may have been held since the grant was made, so that in actual fact women may never have gone to the polls. If possible, I hope the Secretary-General next year can give us some reassurance along this line.

Another way in which the United Nations may be helpful to governments is in developing leadership. We speak often of the right of suffrage being granted to women, but there would be little value in such a grant unless the women of that country are interested in public questions.

The U.N. fellowship program has included a number of women, and I believe some of them have worked in the field of public administration. There may be other programs in the United Nations or in the specialized agencies which can be used to help the leaders in a country where women lack suffrage or have just achieved it. We have not been well informed in this Commission as to what possibilities there are. A statement from the Secretary-General next year would help us evaluate opportunities and also help governments take advantage of them. Such opportunities may be useful to women in trust and non-self-governing territories as well as to women in other countries. Regional conferences similar to the seminar on the status of women conducted recently by UNESCO in India may also be a source of leadership training.

Now I want to talk about what we should be doing with our good ideas. This Commission has had a great many good ideas, especially in regard to political rights for women, and we have done a great many different things with them. We now have the convention, and can center our thinking on how governments can implement the standards set forth in the convention as rapidly as possible and with the greatest possible effect. There is considerable danger, it seems to us, that if we scatter our recommendations too widely, or put them forward in unrelated documents, governments will not find it easy to locate the suggestions they need and will feel confused as to what we have recommended.

Two years ago when the ILO adopted the convention on equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value—known as the equal pay convention—it also adopted a formal recommendation to governments on how to promote the principle of equal pay. This contained a series of specific suggestions as to de-

veloping legislation and standards and also on evaluating results. We believe that something of the same sort would be useful in regard to the Convention on Political Rights of Women, and that we might ask the Secretary-General to gather together during the coming year the various suggestions that might go into it. These suggestions might come from different sources, and be directed, at least at the start, to governments where equal suffrage has not yet been attained. Each of us can probably contribute some ideas for a recommendation of this sort, and our non-governmental organization consultants will also have a great deal to offer. The Secretary-General can also draw on earlier actions in this Commission, such as the pamphlet on *Political Education of Women* which has proved useful in a number of countries. The recommendation should be very simple and practical, and realistic, a how-to-do-it plan to supplement the statement of principles in the convention.

"Ground Floor" Approach Urged

For instance, some governments may feel that they cannot yet win parliamentary approval of votes for women, but believe that in a few years the parliament will be ready to give its assent. We might recommend that in such countries any new laws or constitutions adopted avoid limiting suffrage specifically to male citizens, and instead provide that Parliaments have the power to define the qualifications for voters. This would make it unnecessary to go through the long process of constitutional revision when the country is ready to extend the vote to women. The new constitution of Libya follows this plan. A recommendation along this line might have been helpful during the drafting of the new constitution of Eritrea. The Eritrean constitution provides suffrage rights only for men, so that will have to be amended when Eritrean women gain the franchise.

Another recommendation that might help a great deal in countries where the institutions of self-government are just beginning to take shape, is to take women in at the beginning and avoid any tradition of segregation of women and their interests. This recommendation may be especially useful in the trust and non-self-governing territories, but it applies to new activities in all governments, developed as well as less developed.

If there is any one lesson we can draw from experience, I suppose it is that it is never too early to begin. Once an organization is set up with the women on the outside, even a department of government, it is difficult for women to be accepted as full participants. Much trouble can be avoided if, as each institution of government is developed, schools, health services, local police, political parties, town or tribal councils, or whatever it may be, women are brought in on the administration of such projects from the start,

as members of school boards, public-health directors, policewomen, party workers and committee chairmen, and also in professional and staff positions. If it is found women have not had a chance to train for such jobs, they can be given special opportunities to catch up on essentials.

International Materials Conference

Distribution of Molybdenum

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on March 23 its recommended distribution of molybdenum for the second calendar quarter of 1953.¹ The Governments of all 13 countries represented on the Committee have accepted the recommendations. These countries are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Molybdenum and nickel remain now the only commodities subject to distribution by the International Materials Conference.

In accepting the recommendations, the Government of the United States restated the condition that domestic users of molybdenum in the United States should be authorized to purchase the quantity of such material allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference and not used by any such participating country. In view of this, the Committee agreed to continue the arrangements made whereby such domestic users in the United States or other countries would have the opportunity to purchase molybdenum allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference but not used by any such participating country.

The total free world production of molybdenum in the first quarter of 1953 is estimated by the Committee at 6,448.25 metric tons metal content. Total availabilities exceed this amount by a carry-over of 30 tons from 1952 availabilities. The estimated production for the second quarter is at about the same level as that for the first quarter of 1953, which was over 75 percent above the rate of production in 1950. On the other hand, the defense and stockpiling requirements of the free world are still in excess of the estimated production.

The plan recommended provides for the distribution of the whole free world production of molybdenum, both in the form of ores and concentrates and primary products. Primary products are defined, as in the case of previous distributions by the Committee, as ferro-molybdenum, molybdic acid and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide. Roasted

¹ For distribution plan, see IMC press release of Mar. 23.

molybdenum concentrates are regarded by the Committee as being included in ores and concentrates, as in the case of previous distribution plans.

In framing the recommended plan of distribution, the needs of all countries, whether members of the Committee or not, were carefully considered. The distribution plan is now transmitted to all governments, including those not represented on the Committee, wherever the countries concerned are interested in the export or import of molybdenum in the form of ores and concentrates or primary products. All Governments are being requested to carry out the plan of distribution recommended.

Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee To Be Terminated

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on March 20 that its members have agreed to the dissolution of the Committee on March 31, 1953. This announcement follows the Committee's recent decision to discontinue international allocation of primary copper on February 15,² and reflects the continuing improvement in the supply/demand position of copper in the free world.

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee, which was the first of the commodity groups to be established within the framework of the Imc, met for the first time on February 26, 1951. The Committee's recommendations for the first international allocations of copper and zinc were accepted by its member governments for the fourth quarter of 1951 and continued, for zinc, until the end of May 1952, and for copper, until the middle of February 1953. Although the supply/demand position of lead was kept under review the Committee did not, at any time, find it necessary to recommend international allocation of that metal.

The following countries were represented on the Committee: Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Distribution of Primary Nickel

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 26 announced acceptance by 13 of its 14 member governments of a second quarter 1953 plan of distribution³ for primary nickel and oxides. The reply of the Government of Belgium is still awaited. The recommended plan has been forwarded to all interested governments for implementation.

In this plan, as in those for the last two quarters of 1952 and the first quarter of 1953, provision has been made whereby any nickel allocated to countries participating in the distribution, but not used by them, will become available for purchase

by consumers in the United States and in other countries.

The total production estimate of primary nickel and oxides for the second quarter of 1953, excluding Japanese production, shows an increase of about 200 metric tons nickel content over the figure for the first quarter, or less than one-half of one percent. About 500 tons of nickel oxides (in nickel content), produced in the U.S. Nicaro plant in Cuba during the second half of 1952 in excess of the original estimate for that period, has been included in the second quarter distribution. The total quantity distributed in the recommended plan amounts to 37,800 metric tons nickel content.

An amount of approximately 500 metric tons of Japanese nickel available for export is not included in the plan of distribution because the Committee so far has not been able to determine to what extent importing countries would purchase this high-priced nickel.

The countries represented on the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Commission on Human Rights

The Department of State announced on March 31 (press release 165) that Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, will attend the ninth session of the Commission, scheduled to be held at Geneva, April 6-June 1, 1953. In addition to Mrs. Lord, the U.S. delegation to this meeting will be as follows:

Principal Adviser

Phillip Halpern, Associate Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York State, Third Department

Advisers

James F. Green, Deputy Director, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Warren E. Hewitt, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for U.N. Affairs, Department of State

The Commission on Human Rights, which is one of the permanent functional commissions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, was established in 1946 to advise and assist the Council on all matters relating to the obligation assumed by the members of the United Nations to cooperate with the United Nations toward the achievement of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1953, p. 303.

³ For distribution plan, see Imc press release of Mar. 26.

Eighteen governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its eighth session was held at New York, April 14-June 6, 1952.

Economic and Social Council

The Department of State announced on March 31 (press release 164) that at the fifteenth session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, which opened at New York on that date, the U.S. Government would be represented by the following delegation:

U.S. representative

James J. Wadsworth, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations

Deputy U.S. representative

Walter M. Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

Phillip Arnow, Associate Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Kathleen Bell, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Isaiah Frank, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State

Katherine G. Heath, Office of International Relations, Federal Security Agency

Forrest Murden, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York, N. Y.

Robert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigations Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

William J. Stibravy, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State

William H. Wynne, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Recent developments in the world economic situation will be discussed at the forthcoming session in the light of comprehensive reports which have been prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, as well as by the Secretariats of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Economic Commission for Europe, and Economic Commission for Latin America. The Council will also review (1) the annual report by the International Monetary Fund concerning its activities since the previous session; (2) the annual report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on its financial activities and resources; (3) a report by the Council's Technical Assistance Committee on the program of technical assistance; and (4) reports by several of its functional commissions, including the Transport and Communications Commission, Statistical Commission, and Population Commission.

Provision is also made in the 29-item agenda of the session for the consideration of several topics which have been the subject of special study pursuant to resolutions adopted by the Council

or the General Assembly of the United Nations. Among those topics are measures for the economic development of underdeveloped countries; the international action that may be taken to promote an integrated approach to and a systematic analysis of the problems of conservation and use of nonagricultural resources; the steps which may be taken by the United Nations and its specialized agencies to develop international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination; measures that can be taken by the United Nations to help governments eliminate slavery, the slave trade, and servitude similar to slavery; and allegations regarding infringements of trade-union rights.

The fourteenth session of the Council was held at New York May 20-August 1, 1952. Its 18 members are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, India, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The Department of State announced on March 30 (press release 162) that Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, and U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, will attend the eighth session of that Commission which will convene at New York on March 30.

George A. Morlock, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State, and Alfred L. Tennyson, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, will serve as advisers to the U.S. representative.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs was formally established on a permanent basis in 1946. It assists the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in exercising supervision over the application of international conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs; carries out such of the functions of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs as the Economic and Social Council has assumed and continued; advises the Council on all questions concerning the control of narcotic drugs, and prepares draft international conventions on the subject; and considers changes required in the existing machinery for the international control of narcotics.

The provisional agenda of the eighth session contains 29 items for consideration by the Commission. The items relate to such matters as (1) the proposed single convention on narcotic drugs; (2) cooperation between the United Nations and the Universal Postal Union in respect to the control of narcotic drugs; (3) the abolition of opium smoking in the Far East; (4) annual reports made by governments pursuant to article 21 of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic

drugs, as amended by a protocol signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946; (5) illicit traffic, in which connection the Commission is to consider both summaries of reports on illicit transactions and seizures made pursuant to article 23 of the 1931 convention, as amended by the 1946 protocol, and a proposal by Burma relating to the coordination of the efforts of certain Far Eastern Governments to suppress poppy cultivation and the smuggling of opium; (6) the problem of synthetic

drugs; (7) the problem of Indian hemp; (8) scientific research on narcotics; and (9) the list of narcotic drugs under international control.

The seventh session of the Commission was held at New York April 15-May 9, 1952. The 15 members of the Commission at the present time are Canada, China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia.

The United States in the United Nations

[March 26-April 1]

Security Council

At a closed meeting on March 31, the Security Council by a vote of 10-0-1 adopted a proposal by the French representative recommending to the General Assembly that Dag Hammarskjöld, Swedish Minister of State, be appointed U.N. Secretary-General. This recommendation was transmitted to the President of the General Assembly, and Ahmed Bokhari (Pakistan), President of the Security Council, sent Mr. Hammarskjöld a cable informing him of the recommendation. The message concluded:

In view of the immense importance of this post, more especially at the present time, members of the Security Council express the earnest hope that you will agree to accept the appointment if, as they hope and believe, it is shortly made by the General Assembly.

In a statement issued later that day, Trygve Lie, retiring Secretary-General, said of the recommendation:

. . . If the General Assembly approves the nomination, which the Assembly certainly will do, I shall be able to lay down the heavy burdens of my office with a clear conscience, knowing that a very able man with sound political, diplomatic, and administrative experience will take over and carry on. . . .

On April 1 Mr. Hammarskjöld announced at Stockholm that he had sent the following message to Mr. Bokhari:

With a strong feeling of personal insufficiency, I hesitate to accept candidature but I do not feel that I could refuse to assume the task imposed on me should the Assembly follow the recommendation of the Security Council by which I feel deeply honoured.

General Assembly

General debate on the personnel policy item opened in plenary on March 28. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (U.S.) underlined the necessity of having the full support of world public opinion in order to have the United Nations as an effective force. He also pointed out that public opinion in the United States was concerned lest the United Nations effectiveness be impaired because of the existence of a serious personnel problem. Mr. Lodge indicated that:

The U.S. Government does not believe that persons engaged or who, based on their past and present record, seem likely to engage in subversive activities against any member state should be employed in an international organization. We will do all in our power to provide the Secretary-General with the information necessary to enable him to make a determination on this matter. This does not constitute nor is it intended to constitute dictation to the Secretary-General or other member Governments. It is a service to the United Nations in the interest of maintaining a Secretariat which measures up to standards established in the Charter for international civil servants.

It seemed clear from his report that the standards the Secretary-General proposed to apply would protect staff members against inadequately supported or unreliable representations from member governments; consequently, there should be no doubt as to the continued independence of the Secretariat or as to the safeguarding of individual rights.

Ambassador Lodge stated that the U.S. delegation believed the Assembly should take no action which would hinder the Secretary-General in dealing with the existing situation. However, a

further discussion of this question might be undertaken at the next session, when developments of the intervening period could be reviewed. For these reasons the United States would vote against any text which postponed further action on personnel questions pending the proposed study by a committee.

The resolution introduced jointly by the United States, United Kingdom, and France which had the effect of simply taking note of the report was amended to request a progress report on the development of personnel policy, and the number of its sponsors was increased to 13.

Action on the personnel policy item was completed April 1 with the adoption of the 13-power resolution by a vote of 41-13 (Soviet bloc, India, Indonesia, Burma, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria)-4. Under the approved resolution, the Secretary-General will be permitted to continue to conduct and develop his policies along the lines contained in his report and will be asked to submit a further report to the Eighth General Assembly. The 12-power text calling for the creation of a 15-member commission was rejected by a vote of 21-29-8.

The Assembly then recessed until April 7.

Committee I (Political and Security)—The Committee on March 26 rejected the Czechoslovak resolution charging U.S. interference in the affairs of other states. The vote was 5 (Soviet bloc)-41-14 (Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen). In statements made before the voting, the Soviet and Czechoslovak representatives contended that the U.S. statements on the item had contained slanderous charges intended to divert the Committee's attention from the substance of the matter. After the balloting, several Arab States explained that their abstentions were based in part on the fact that the issue of Zionism had been raised.

At the next day's meeting debate began on the U.S. request for an impartial investigation of charges that U.N. forces used bacteriological warfare. Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) introduced a 16-power resolution under which a five-state commission would be set up to carry out an inquiry after the President of the General Assembly had received indications that the parties concerned had accepted the proposed investigation.

As the debate opened, Valerian A. Zorin (U.S.S.R.), proposed that the Committee invite representatives of Communist China and the North Korean authorities to participate. An impartial investigation of the bacteriological warfare question would be possible only with the participation of the states directly concerned with and affected by the use of bacterial weapons. The motion was rejected by a vote of 15 (Soviet bloc, Egypt, Iraq, India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma, Syria)-40-5 (Argentina, Lebanon, Yugoslavia).

Representatives of South Africa, Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, speaking as co-sponsors of the resolution, pointed out the necessity of exposing the hollowness of the charges. If those making the charges did not accept the resolution, the obvious conclusion would be that the charges were baseless and the world would treat any further allegations or protestations with the contempt they deserved.

The Netherlands welcomed the U.S. request to place the item on the agenda, D. J. von Balluseck said. The full membership of the United Nations should express itself when some governments leveled accusations against others, yet persistently refused to permit an impartial investigation of the charges. The investigation should be undertaken as soon as possible, in his view, and should include an examination of the so-called confessions of the prisoners of war.

Economic and Social Council

At the opening meeting of its 15th session, the Council on April 1 adopted by a vote of 14-0-4 a resolution transmitting to the Human Rights Commission the General Assembly's request for continued preparation of recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. Also approved, by a vote of 15-2 (Poland, U.S.S.R.)-1 (Sweden), was a Latin American draft modifying the rules of procedure to include Spanish as a working language of the Council and its functional organs. A Soviet motion requesting favorable consideration by the General Assembly of a similar status for the Russian language failed, 4 (U.S.S.R., Poland, India, Egypt)-10-4 (France, Yugoslavia, Uruguay, Philippines).

As its third item, the Council debated the U.S. request that Libya, Nepal, Spain, and the Republic of Korea be invited to the Conference on the Limitation of the Production of Opium, scheduled to begin May 11. Recalling that the inscription of the last two countries had not been unanimous, James J. Wadsworth (U.S.) held that the United Nations was interested in Spanish participation since Spain was an important manufacturing and consuming country which had in the past shown willingness to agree to controls on narcotics. As to the Republic of Korea, he pointed out that the General Assembly had recognized it as the lawful Korean Government and that it was a large opium producer.

G. F. Saksin (U.S.S.R.) said that since he had learned that the countries in question had not asked to be invited to the conference, the action proposed by the United States was contrary to self-determination and infringed on national sovereignty. He now could not even vote for invitations to Libya and Nepal, which his Government had originally favored.

Commission on the Status of Women—Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn (U.S.) on March 26 introduced a United States-Haitian resolution urging that regulations regarding distribution of scholarships provide equal opportunities for girls and women, requesting that the Secretary-General continue to cooperate with UNESCO to advance opportunities for education for women, and expressing hope that in programs of fundamental education attention would be given to the importance of providing equal opportunities for women to acquire a language "which will permit them access to the resources of knowledge in the general culture of the country."

It was later agreed to refer to the resolutions committee this proposal and a French draft relating to the number of study fellowships and scholarships granted to men and women students in primary, secondary, higher, and technical education in the member countries.

Representatives of several nongovernment organizations made statements on women's education. Groups represented included the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Women Lawyers, the International Council of Women, the World Union of Catholic Women's organizations, and the International Federation of Business and Professional Women.

On March 27 the Commission adopted a revised Polish resolution which regretted that the Women's International Democratic Federation representative "has not been granted an entry-visa" to permit her to attend the Commission's session, called the attention of the Economic and Social Council to that "abnormal situation," and requested that the Council examine the question at its 15th session in order to take appropriate measures. The vote was 13-1 (U.S.)-2 (China, U.K.).

Members then approved by a vote of 14-0-3 (U. S.) a Cuban-French proposal recommending that Ecosoc draw the attention of Governments and specialized agencies to the need of ensuring identical basic school curricula for pupils of both sexes. Action on the educational item was completed with the unanimous approval of the resolu-

tions committee's version of the U. S.-Haitian and French drafts on granting scholarships to women and on allowing women opportunities to acquire a second language in countries where native and official languages exist.

At the same meeting, Mrs. Hahn submitted, with Cuba, a resolution on the equal-pay-for-equal-work item. The proposal noted that the principle was sound business practice, urged increased efforts toward widespread implementation in all states, and asked the International Labor Organization to furnish periodic progress reports. It was agreed that this text would be combined with another equal-pay draft sponsored by France, the Netherlands, and Pakistan.

On March 30 the Commission approved a Netherlands-Pakistan proposal relating to the work of women in cottage industries and handicrafts and in seasonal agricultural work in underdeveloped countries. The vote was 12-3 (Soviet bloc)-1 (France).

The combined Cuba-France-Netherlands-Pakistan-U.S. text on equal pay, as slightly modified by the resolutions committee, was adopted on March 31 by a vote of 14-0-3 (Soviet bloc). Also adopted was an amended version of a Dominican Republic-Venezuelan resolution on participation of women in the work of the United Nations; the vote was 15-0-2 (U. K., New Zealand). A Pakistani draft recommending the appointment of qualified women to technical-assistance posts was adopted unanimously.

The Commission completed its substantive work on April 1 after unanimously approving a priorities program for 1953-54 as proposed by the United States. Consideration of the item on women in public law was deferred to the Commission's next session.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

John M. Allison

The Senate on April 2 confirmed John M. Allison as Ambassador to Japan.

William Howard Taft, III

The Senate on April 2 confirmed William Howard Taft, III, as Ambassador to Ireland.

Correction

BULLETIN of March 30, 1953, p. 480: Mrs. Lord's title should be, "U. S. Representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights."

Department Opposes Continuation of Extraordinary Restrictions on Certain Imports

Statement by Harold F. Linder

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

Press release 166 dated April 1

I wish to thank the committee for the opportunity of testifying with respect to this bill. The Department is interested mainly in two problems related to the bill, namely, the need for continuing powers to insure that adequate supplies of materials are available for the free-world defense effort and the deletion of section 104 from the bill.²

The Department agrees with the premise that direct economic controls, while basically incompatible with the American system, may be needed in certain circumstances. Experience has shown that the benefits of such controls in an emergency period extend not only to the United States but to allied and other friendly nations throughout the world. A significant contribution to world economic stability was made when the United States instituted comprehensive economic controls after the invasion of Korea. In another comparable emergency, the interests of the whole free world might again rest on prompt action by the U.S. Government to hold inflationary forces in check and channel resources to essential needs.

Whether it is necessary to enact standby authority for the several types of direct economic controls, as they are no longer currently needed, is a question which the Department considers to be outside its competence. It defers in this to the agencies responsible for those controls.

The Department does, however, have specific comments on certain other aspects of S. 753. This bill would place in standby condition title I of the present Defense Production Act. The authority to establish priorities and to allocate materials and facilities, conveyed by section 101, like that to stimulate expansion of productive capacity (title III), is still needed to assure adequate materials

for the free-world defense effort. Section 101 should be retained on an active, unconditional basis so that there can be a prompt and orderly transition to the modified system of materials control needed to safeguard defense production after June 30.

It is not only U.S. defense programs that might be impaired by lapse of this section. The progress of military programs of other free nations now depends in part upon U.S. supplies. The law presently permits us to assure supplies for these programs as well as for our own. It is in the interest of our total defensive strength that this continues to be possible.

As I said at the outset, this Department attaches great importance to the deletion from the new legislation of section 104, which restricts imports of certain agricultural commodities including dairy products. This section would not appear to be germane, to the general purposes of S. 753, to provide standby authority for emergency economic controls. Rather, it deals with current problems affecting our international trade relations and domestic agricultural programs.

Apart from the question of appropriateness in this context, the Department of State has given careful thought to the need for continuation of section 104, and we can only conclude that this provision has been so harmful to our international trade relations that to continue it, whether on an active or a standby basis, would be unwise. In saying this, I want to make it perfectly clear to the committee that the Department of State is keenly aware of the difficulties with which we are now faced in connection with our domestic dairy products program. However, there are other remedies in our laws which can be used to deal with situations in which imports might impair agricultural programs for dairy products or cause serious injury to the dairy industry. Such remedies exist in section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1934 as amended and in the "escape clause" of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.

¹ Made before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee with respect to S. 753, "Emergency Stabilization Act of 1953," on Apr. 1.

² Text of section 104 of S. 753 is identical to section 104 of the present Defense Production Act. Except for certain discretions given the Secretary of Agriculture in the administration of the import restrictions, section 104 is that printed in the BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 518.

The extension of section 104 by the United States would do considerable damage to our efforts to achieve economic strength and solvency among friendly foreign countries. The President emphasized in his State of the Union message to the Congress that, "Our foreign policy will recognize the importance of profitable and equitable world trade."³ By introducing trade barriers which are not essential to the protection of American agriculture, the restrictions imposed under section 104 defeat this objective.

The extension of section 104 controls would compel the United States to continue to act inconsistently with agreements previously undertaken with friendly countries. The continued disregard of these commitments in the face of well-founded and repeated protests from 10 countries is seriously undermining efforts to build confidence in our leadership along the whole front of our foreign policy as may be observed from the notes we have received,⁴ copies of which I should like to submit for the record.

It is difficult to overemphasize the significance which foreign countries attribute to section 104 and our action under it. In part, the reason for their concern lies in the injurious effect of our section 104 restrictions on their trade; it hampers their efforts to overcome balance-of-payments difficulties and makes it more difficult to reduce their need for extraordinary assistance from the United States. But it is to a perhaps even greater degree the symbolic significance of section 104, as to the direction of U.S. trade policy, which arouses concern. The fact is that, for them, the bill carries the implication that the United States is moving away from a policy of cooperation with its allies toward a restrictionism which disregards both our obligations and their needs. Even our friends in other countries are hard put to defend us. Our enemies seize upon each such example to make the claim that the United States wants not free partners in a mutual exchange of goods, but only dependencies where American surpluses can be conveniently dumped.

It has to be borne in mind that one of the express purposes of the international agreements which section 104 compels the United States to violate is to further the interests of American agriculture. The prosperity of American agriculture depends, in the first instance, on domestic prosperity. But, as the President pointed out in his message on the state of the Union, it depends also "upon the opportunity to ship abroad large surpluses of particular commodities, and, therefore, upon sound economic relationships between the United States

and many foreign countries." By denying friendly foreign countries an opportunity to engage in profitable and equitable trade with the United States, this law limits their purchases of American agricultural commodities as well as a wide range of products from other American industries and enterprises. The close tie between our imports and our export sales is illustrated by the fact that one government, the Netherlands, has curtailed its imports of wheat flour from the United States specifically because of section 104 restrictions, and several other governments are considering similar action. At a time when American agricultural exports are already falling off, we can ill afford any further decline in such sales.

For these reasons, this Department is of the view that section 104 should be permitted to expire and that there should be no extension of this provision beyond June 30, 1953, either in the legislation under consideration or other acts of Congress.

ANNEX

Canadian Note of February 10, 1953

The Canadian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the Canadian Embassy's Notes of August 28, 1951 (No. 496) and January 17, 1952, regarding the restrictions imposed upon imports of fats, oils and dairy products under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951.

The Secretary of State will be aware that these import restrictions were considered at the sixth and seventh sessions of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and that resolutions were adopted recognizing these measures to be contrary to the provisions of the Agreement.

On the occasion of the announcement on December 30, 1952 of further import restrictions, relating to dried milk products, the Canadian Government re-examined the situation resulting from these restrictions. On the basis of this review the Canadian Government would again express its serious concern at this infringement of international agreements to which the Governments of the United States and of Canada are parties. The Government of Canada wishes to call the attention of the Government of the United States to the effects of these measures not only on trade between the United States and Canada but also on the broad commercial policy interests of the two Governments.

The Government of Canada considers that such departures from accepted principles of commercial policy by the leading trading nation can hardly fail to weaken the force of those principles and to damage seriously the development of world trade on a constructive basis.

Both Canada and the United States, recognizing the weakening effect of continued reliance on import restrictions on economies of friendly countries, have frequently encouraged them to seek solutions to their balance of payment difficulties through increasing exports rather than curtailing imports. Actions by the United States Government such as that represented by these import restrictions tend to undermine the confidence of overseas deficit countries in their ability to approach a balance by increasing their dollar earnings. These measures may in consequence have the effect of discouraging attempts which might be made by such countries, in the face of great difficulties, to change the general direction of na-

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 208.

⁴ Texts of eight notes submitted since June 1, 1952, are printed as an annex to Mr. Linder's statement. For texts of earlier notes, see part 4 of the Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951 before Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2951-2958.

tional policies away from reliance on discriminatory import restrictions as methods of achieving international balance.

The Government of Canada, accordingly, takes this opportunity to urge once more that the import restrictions imposed under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951 be removed as soon as possible.

New Zealand Note of March 31, 1953^{*}

The Ambassador of New Zealand presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the recent decision of the United States Government to place an embargo on imports of dried wholemilk, dried buttermilk and dried cream, effective from 1 April 1953. It may be recollected that the importance of this trade to New Zealand was discussed by the Ambassador with the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs on 9 March, and that a note was addressed to the Secretary of State at that time, explaining the effect on New Zealand's economy of all United States restrictions against imports of dairy products.

In view of the full information already supplied to the United States Government in this connection, it is felt unnecessary at this time to enter into a detailed statement of the difficulties created in New Zealand by the decision to place an embargo on imports of dried milk products. The New Zealand Government has asked, however, that the United States Government should be informed of the surprise and disappointment with which the recent decision has been received in New Zealand. The immediate loss of potential dollar-earnings is one that New Zealand can ill afford. The new embargo has the effect of seriously restricting New Zealand's dollar earning capacity which has already been weakened by the actions of the United States in placing embargoes on butter and non-fat dried milk solids and in permitting imports of cheddar cheese only under a quota system. The range of the United States restrictions on imports of dairy products, which accounts for one-third of all New Zealand's export earnings, is now so broad that New Zealand's capacity to secure dollar exchange from exports is gravely reduced.

The New Zealand Government has drawn the attention of the United States Government on other occasions to the fact that restrictions of the kind adopted by the United States in respect of dairy products have been recognised as a clear breach of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Although the countries affected have been given rights of retaliation under the Agreement, the New Zealand Government still does not consider such action to be a satisfactory answer to the problem. The New Zealand Government is, however, concerned over the apparent lack of harmony between the actions of the United States in respect of dairy products, and the spirit of understanding that prevails in other relations between the two countries.

The hope is earnestly expressed that the United States Government will, upon reflection, recognise the broad economic implications of trade restrictions of this kind and the difficulties they create in a country like New Zealand which is so heavily reliant upon free access to world markets for its limited range of export products. The New Zealand Government sincerely trusts that the United States Government may find it possible to permit a resumption of New Zealand's export trade with the United States in dried milk and other dairy products thus bringing its practice in this field into accord with the letter and the spirit of the mutual obligations undertaken by the two countries through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

^{*}Three previous notes dated Sept. 17, 1952, Jan. 15, 1953, and Mar. 9, 1953, have been sent by the Government of New Zealand.

Australian Note of March 30, 1953^{*}

The Australian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honourable the Secretary of State and upon instructions from the Australian Government, has the honour to make the following communication.

On January 23, 1953, the Australian Government drew the attention of the Government of the United States to the situation created by the continued operation of restrictions on the importation of dairy products into the United States under Section 104 of the Defence Production Act. At the same time the Australian Government referred to the recent application of import quotas to dried whole milk and dried buttermilk and requested the United States Government to amend the Australian quota which had been based on a period unfavourable to Australian exports of these items. On September 11, 1951, representations were also made by the Australian Government in regard to import restrictions on dairy products authorised by the Defence Production Act and notes were presented concerning the prohibition on imports of butter on June 6, 1950, October 7, 1949 and September 23, 1949.

The Australian Government regrets that it must now once more draw the attention of the United States Government to the recently announced prohibition on imports of dried whole milk, dried buttermilk and dried cream as from April 1, 1953.

The Australian Government has previously pointed out that restrictions and prohibitions on the importation of dairy products into the United States not only accentuate the difficulties of re-establishing world trade equilibrium and nullify attempts made in Australia to adapt the Australian dairying industry to the requirements of a major potential market but have been determined by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to impair concessions negotiated under that agreement and infringe Article XI of the Agreement.

For a number of years the Australian Government has supported trade policies advocated by the United States which found expression in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However, it has become increasingly difficult to find justification for the restrictions that the Agreement imposes on the methods which Australia may adopt to foster its own developing industries. It is only by the promotion of exports through a free access to markets for its major industries such as the dairying industry that the Australian economy can support some restriction on its freedom to protect domestic production.

The Australian Government therefore trusts that the United States Government will, at an early date, see its way to remove the recently imposed prohibitions on imports of dried whole milk and buttermilk and its long standing prohibition on imports of butter and other restrictions imposed on the importation of dairy products under the Defence-Production Act.

Danish Note of March 17, 1953^{*}

The Danish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor once more to draw the attention of the United States Government to the serious concern of his Government at the restrictions imposed under Section 104 in the Defense Production Act on imports into the United States of Dairy Products.

Under the above provisions the import of one of the principal Danish export commodities, Butter, is subject to a complete embargo nullifying tariff concessions obtained from the United States Government by Denmark and other countries on a quid pro quo basis under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Imports of another product, which would otherwise

^{*}A previous note dated Jan. 23, 1953 was also sent by the Australian Government.

^{*}A previous note was sent by the Danish Government on Sept. 9, 1952.

have been a particularly suitable object of endeavors to increase Danish dollar earnings, Blue Mold Cheese, have been kept at an artificially low level.

In addition hereto quota limitations have recently been applied to the import of Dry Whole Milk, at a time when Danish exporters had succeeded in establishing a competitive market here for this product trying, in this way, to make up for lost markets here for other milk products such as butter and cheese.

The nature of the provisions of Section 104 is well illustrated by the fact that while *falling* domestic production would invoke action through imposition of quotas under sub-paragraph *a*, an *increasing* domestic production may establish a case for import restrictions under *c*.

Both at the 6th and 7th sessions of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade a resolution was passed to the effect that the United States import restrictions under Section 104 constitute an infringement of Article XI of the General Agreement, and that the circumstances were serious enough to justify recourse to Article XXIII, par. 2 (withdrawal of concessions) by the contracting parties affected. It was recommended (in the words of the resolution of the 7th session) "that the United States Government have regard to the effects of its continued application of these restrictive measures in breach of the General Agreement and continue its efforts to secure the repeal of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act as the only satisfactory solution of this problem." The United States Government was requested "to report to the Contracting Parties at as early a date as possible and, in any case, not later than the opening of the 8th session of the Contracting Parties on the action which it has taken."

It is the earnest hope of the Danish Government that the United States Government will continue to use its best endeavors to secure the abolishment of the provisions in Section 104 at the expiry of the Defense Production Act on June 30, this year, and to use its influence to prevent actions to establish a substitute legislation based on similar principles.

It would seem to be a matter of particular concern that the United States Government should not let itself be distracted from this aim—or Congress be unduly influenced—by the existence of temporary Government surplus stocks of butter. As repeatedly pointed out by the Administration, and also by a leading Farmers' Organization, during discussions in Congress on Section 104, other provisions, such as Section 22 in the Agricultural Adjustment Act as amended, establish authority and procedure for limitation of imports of any products for which there is an agricultural program (including price support), whenever it is found that imports interfere, or are practically certain to interfere, materially with such a program.

The Danish Government, of course, does not view with favor any such provisions. However, the application of Section 22, as it now stands, and similar provisions would not, as seems to be the case of Section 104, mean the establishment once and for all of what in practical terms amounts to a complete embargo on the importation of butter.

The Danish Government has noted with great interest the very specific recommendations on the question of dairy imports, including butter, made in the recent report to the President by the National Advisory Board of the Mutual Security Agency and trusts that eventually action will be taken along the lines suggested. It has also noted that several important trade organizations, including some representing agriculture, have recommended the abolishment of the provisions of Section 104. The same recommendation was contained in the so-called "Sawyer-Report" of December last year. The provisions are condemned as incompatible with the traditional policy of the United States Government to establish a more liberal international trade and payments system, the progress of which has been frustrated by the difficulties of overseas countries

to earn a sufficient amount of dollars to pay for imports from the United States of agricultural and other products.

It is noted that certain modifications of the cheese import restrictions have been made lately. These modifications, however, apply principally to types of cheese imported from countries other than Denmark, which means that a *de facto* discriminatory element has been established in the administration of Section 104. As already pointed out in Monsieur de Kauffmann's note of September 9, 1952, it is a matter of special regret to the Danish Government that full restrictions are maintained on imports of Blue Mold Cheese at a time when another type of cheese, which from a practical point of view must be considered quite similar in respect of appearance, quality, taste and consumption purposes, has been wholly exempted from control.

In a press release of December 30, 1952, Mr. Brannan, then Secretary of Agriculture, announced an increase of 500,000 lbs. in the basic annual quota for Blue Mold Cheese. It is interesting to note that the communique stated that the quota increase was made in recognition of the strong demand for this type of cheese. Further it stated that "although domestic production of Blue Mold Cheese has recovered substantially in the past years, prices of both the domestic and the imported product have remained firm". In the opinion of the Danish Government it might not have been unreasonable to expect that, under the circumstances referred to, the Department of Agriculture would have found occasion to include Blue Mold Cheese among the several other types of cheese released from import control, thereby removing a cause of friction. On a *prima facie* basis it would seem that removal of the import restrictions on Blue Mold Cheese, under the circumstances, in no way would be contrary to the provisions of Section 104. In this connection it is well worth observing that, to the knowledge of the Danish Government, none of the modifications of restrictions on dairy imports, granted so far, have met with public criticism in the press or otherwise.

The Danish Government would, therefore, ask that the United States Government once more consider the matter with a view to exempting Blue Mold Cheese from the quota restrictions.

As pointed out by the Cheese Importers Association of America, during hearings on the 13th instant in the Senate Banking and Currency Committee to terminate restrictions on cheese imports, these imports do not, under the present circumstances anyway, threaten domestic manufacture. Prices of imported types of cheese, possibly with the exception of Cheddar, are higher than prices of domestic cheeses. The retail price of Danablu is at present 87-89 cents per lb. or 14-21 cents per lb. more than the price of domestic Blue Cheese.

While there seems to be a very firm demand for this type of cheese, as also pointed out in the announcement by the Department of Agriculture on the 30th of December, domestic production has increased by 5,000,000 lbs. from 1951 to 1952, and imports were *cut* about 2,000,000 lbs. by the import restrictions.

If, in spite of this situation and against the sincere hopes of the Danish Government, the Department of Agriculture does not consider it possible to remove Blue Mold Cheese from the list of cheeses still subject to quota restrictions, it is very much hoped that it will be possible, at the very least, to increase the present quota which permits an import during the first half of 1953 of only 1,575,000 lbs. as compared with 2,450,000 lbs. during the second half of 1952.

If the quota is not increased this will not only affect Danish dollar earnings, but may also create serious difficulties in the long run for the sale of Danablu in the American market. Danablu is distributed by the importers mainly to a number of large retail stores. These stores insist on being able to rely on regular deliveries of certain minimum quantities and, due to the shortage, a few have already discontinued handling Danablu.

Swedish Note of March 30, 1953

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Sweden presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to bring the following to his attention.

On December 30, 1952, the Department of Agriculture announced import quotas for dried whole milk, dried buttermilk and dried cream, which products had until then been imported without restrictions.

On March 24, 1953, the Department of Agriculture placed the import of the said products under embargo, starting April 1. Of the quotas granted for the first quarter of 1953 only such quantities will be allowed to enter, which are shipped through March 31.

The Swedish Government has instructed me to express its grave concern about these import restrictions, which have been imposed pursuant to Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, as amended. In doing so, I wish to call attention especially to the following facts and circumstances.

Already before World War II Sweden was a better customer of goods produced in the United States than were the United States of goods produced in Sweden. After World War II there has been a great export surplus from the United States to Sweden. For each of the years 1951 and 1952 this surplus amounted to more than 70,000,000 dollars.

A considerable export surplus on the side of the United States has existed also with regard to agricultural products. In 1951 Sweden imported from the United States food products to an amount of about 10,000,000 dollars but exported to the United States such products to an amount of only about 1,500,000 dollars. Furthermore, in the same year Sweden imported from the United States large amounts of other agricultural products than food, i.e. cotton and tobacco. The same trend seems to have been prevailing during 1952.

However, the quantity of agricultural products imported to Sweden from the United States during the last years has been smaller than the quantity, which used to be imported before World War II. Scarcity of dollars has made it impossible for Sweden to buy such products in the United States to the same extent as earlier.

From what now has been said it will be clear that obstacles to Swedish exports to the United States must lead to a decrease in the United States exports to Sweden, including decreased outlets for the agricultural production of the United States.

The Swedish Government has on many occasions shown its willingness to cooperate fully in the efforts to expand world trade, in which the United States has taken a leading part. The Swedish Government for its part has proved this readiness as one of the Contracting Parties of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade. The United States restrictions on the imports of dairy products have been generally recognized as contrary to this Agreement.

The Swedish Government has with great satisfaction noticed the interest in developing free trade, expressed by the President of the United States. It has also noticed the strong support, which the leaders of the three great American Farm Organizations have given to a liberalization of American trade policy, also with regard to agricultural products. There seems, however, to be an apparent lack of harmony between on one hand the expressed policy of the United States and the views of the great majority of American farmers as stated by their leaders and on the other hand the restrictions on the imports of dairy products.

The Swedish Government, therefore, sees with greatest concern the imposition at this time of a further import restriction on a Swedish agricultural product, which during recent months has been able to find an expanding market in the United States and thus would in the future contribute substantially to the Swedish dollar earning.

With reference to the above the Swedish Government expresses its sincere hope that the Government of the United States will find it possible to reconsider the re-

strictions imposed under the Section 104 of the Defense Production Act.

Netherlands Note of March 31, 1953^a

The Netherlands Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to a press release of the United States Department of Agriculture, Production and Marketing Administration, dated March 24, 1953, in which an embargo on imports of dried whole milk, dried butter milk, and dried cream, effective April 1, 1953 is announced.

The absolute character of this measure, coming in addition to continuing restrictions on the import of Netherlands Edam and Gouda cheeses, will undoubtedly have a severely adverse effect upon Netherlands public opinion in general and that of the export community in particular. In this connection Dr. Van Roijen refers to his note of March 2, 1953, in which he transmitted the great concern of the Netherlands Government about the import restrictions on dried milk products which had been imposed on December 30, 1952, under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act. It was hoped that the United States Government would see its way to reconsider the import limitations on Netherlands dairy products.

While not yet having received instructions from his Government, the Netherlands Ambassador would like to express his keen disappointment at the present action which appears to scatter the hope he expressed in his previous note.

Italian Note of June 30, 1952^b

The Italian Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to inform of the following:

The Congressional Record of June 28, 1952, page 8585, has published the report of the Senate-House Conference on Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, concerning imports of oils and fats, and informs that the Secretary of Agriculture will be authorized to increase by 15% the limitations on imports of foreign cheeses "for each type or variety which he might deem necessary, taking into consideration the broad effects on international relationship and trade."

The Committee of conference has moreover stated in its report that the control on cheese imports *will not be exercised with respect to types of cheeses, such as Roquefort and Switzerland Swiss, which, because of their U.S. selling price, are clearly not competitive with domestically produced cheeses.*

The Italian Embassy wishes to call attention to the fact that Italian cheeses, although not specifically mentioned in the congressional records, *are not competitive with the domestic production* and therefore should be exempted from import control.

As pointed out in previous notes of this Embassy, Italian cheeses exported to the United States consist largely of sheep's milk cheeses such as Pecorino and Provolone (not produced in this country), or, as in the case of Parmigiano, Reggiano and other Italian grating cheeses, they are subject to particularly lengthy processes of production and seasoning, which causes their selling price in the United States to be 50% higher than the American product.

The differentials in current retail prices of these Italian cheeses and American type are as high or higher than those of Roquefort and Switzerland Swiss cheese. For this reason the Italian Embassy insists that Italian cheeses be exempted from import control as they are not competitive with domestically produced cheeses.

The difference in prices between Italian type and other

^aTwo previous notes dated July 7, 1952 and Mar. 2, 1953 have been sent by the Government of the Netherlands.

^bFor text of a *note verbale* from the Italian Government dated Jan. 15, 1952, together with the U.S. reply of Apr. 15, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, pp. 660-661.

foreign and domestic cheeses has been reported in the Congressional Record of June 19 (page 7781). The prices of typical Italian cheese and domestic production are as follows:

<i>Cheese type</i>	<i>Retail price</i>
Italian Parmigiano (imported)-----	\$1. 29-1. 80
American Parmesan-----	0. 75-0. 85
Italian Reggiano (imported)-----	1. 15-2. 25
American type-----	0. 89
Italian Pecorino Romano (imported)----	0. 95-1. 19
American type-----	0. 69
Italian Provolone (imported)-----	1. 19-1. 30
American Provolone-----	0. 65-0. 69

The Italian Embassy asks the Department of State to kindly bring these facts to the attention of the Department of Agriculture, so that Italian typical cheeses may be exempted from import controls, on the same basis as Roquefort and Switzerland Swiss, which in the report of the conference have been mentioned as an example (i. e., "such as").

In the event that the Department of Agriculture should exempt only these two types of cheeses mentioned in the report, the Italian Embassy wishes to point out that such treatment would constitute a discrimination against Italian cheeses, particularly in view of the even more striking characteristics and price differentials of the Italian cheese with the American domestic product, and in view also of the serious damage that is being caused to the Italian economy by recent import restrictions.

The cheese quotas have deprived Italy of the possibility to earn an estimated \$2,000,000 which would have been used to buy United States products (especially agricultural products).

Restrictions against cheese exports to the United States bear chiefly on Sardinia and other regions of Southern Italy for which the manufacture of cheese has been for centuries the main source of livelihood. As it is known, the communist agitators have seized upon the economic distress in these regions resulting from United States import restrictions, to foment trouble and disorder.

For the above reasons, the Embassy urges the suspension of any restrictions on typical Italian cheeses, in harmony with the recent decisions of Congress to exempt from import control foreign cheeses which are not competitive with American products.

The Italian Embassy expresses its thanks to the Department of State for its consideration and assistance.

Argentine Note of March 5, 1953

MR. SECRETARY:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, with the return of climatic conditions to normalcy, the production of cheese has increased in Argentina, and this has made it possible again to build up considerable exportable stocks.

Argentina has traditionally been a large exporter of cheeses to the United States, especially cheeses of the Italian type, so sought after by consumers in this country. As a result of the extraordinary drought which occurred in my country in recent years, Argentine exports of cheese to the United States have declined greatly, particularly since 1951.

Our Government had the opportunity on previous occasions to express its opinion regarding the harm done to the trade between our two countries by the provisions of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the subsequent amendment thereof permitting one-third of the quotas fixed for each date to be transferred to another country, according to supply needs. The amendment has meant a considerable cut in Argentina's quota in favor of Italy. These provisions are making their nega-

tive effects especially felt at a time when the recovery of Argentine production permits considerably increasing the shipments to the United States. Argentina is at present in a position to fill the entire quota fixed in the said legal provision, including the one-third transferred to Italy, and we therefore respectfully request that this situation be given consideration in the amounts to be imported to the end of the present period, i. e., June 30 of this year. We likewise request that, should new quotas be established for the year 1953-54, full consideration be given to the Argentine situation. In such an event, we also request modification of the present basis for the assignment of quotas, which took the average for the years 1948-50 as a period showing the proportions for each country and each importer. We affirm that the adoption of that period was not really fair, for during those years imports from Argentina declined in comparison with previous years, as a result of the drought.

As a matter of fact, Argentina had exported substantial quantities from 1940 on. In some of those years, the figure of 10,000 tons per year was exceeded. Thus the ratios between Argentine cheese imports and total cheese imports into the United States were very high during those years, in several instances exceeding 80 percent. Those quantities and especially the ratios decreased appreciably from 1947, so that in the three-year period adopted as a base (1948-50), Argentine imports were reduced to an average of 3,500 tons and represented only 20.6 percent of the total imports of the United States, whereas adopting a longer period and therefore one more representative of the situation of international trade, for example, the period 1938-1950, leads to the conclusion that Argentine exports to the United States averaged 4,500 tons, or nearly 35 percent of the total imports.

Now, if reference is made only to cheeses subject to quota, which comprise most of the cheeses that Argentina exports to the United States, the proportions for the periods 1948-50 and 1938-50 are 32 percent and 51 percent, respectively. We therefore maintain that the absolute quantities and the proportions adopted for Argentina according to the regulations do not represent the true share that has traditionally fallen to our country in the total imports.

It behooves us to mention the circumstances that cheese imports are proportionately very small in the United States domestic market and are steadily decreasing. From somewhat more than 10 percent at the beginning of the thirties, these imports have declined appreciably and are now oscillating around 3 percent, so that they cannot cause serious disturbances in the domestic market or in production, nor can they be reflected in increased expenses resulting from the Government price-support policy.

Furthermore, the maintenance of quotas does not seem to be in accord with the new trends of the Government's economic policy or with the necessary expansion of regional economies, a basic factor in the general advancement of well-being in the world.

For these reasons and in compliance with express instructions from my Government, I request Your Excellency to be so good as to see that the proper authorities of the United States Government consider the elimination of the quota system affecting Argentine cheese imports or, failing that, to have a new analysis made of the present system of distribution of quotas of the said product, so that it may be fairer and may definitively permit a substantial increase in Argentine cheese exports to the United States, which my country will be in a position to satisfy to the extent required.

I avail myself of the opportunity to express to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

[Signed] HIPÓLITO J. PAZ
Ambassador

Agriculture

Department opposes continuation of certain agricultural imports (texts of notes) . . . 554

Technical cooperation agreement with Pakistan . . . 531

American Principles

The pattern of U.S.-Indian relations (Allen) . . . 523

Asia

BURMA: Asks discontinuance of U.S. aid program (telegraphic text) . . . 530

Control of shipments to Communist China, North Korea . . . 532

INDIA: The pattern of U.S.-Indian relations (Allen) . . . 523

JAPAN: Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation . . . 531

KOREA: Proposal for settlement of prisoner-of-war question (Chou En-lai, White, Clark, Molotov) . . . 526

PAKISTAN: Technical cooperation agreement . . . 531

Congress

Current legislation on foreign policy listed . . . 533

Europe

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Subversion charges against U.S. refuted (Lodge) . . . 539

Fourth anniversary of Naro (Eisenhower, Dulles) . . . 525

GERMANY: Visit of Chancellor Adenauer . . . 529

Review of the Ecw Economic Survey of Europe (Camp) . . . 534

U.S.S.R.: Assessment of Soviet gestures (Dulles) . . . 524

Foreign Service

Confirmations (Allison, Taft) . . . 553

Human Rights

Commission on Human Rights . . . 549

International Meetings

International Materials Conference . . . 548

U.S. DELEGATIONS:

Commission on Human Rights . . . 549

Economic and Social Council . . . 550

U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs . . . 550

Mutual Aid and Defense

Burma asks discontinuance of U.S. aid program . . . 530

National Security Council

Planning board to assist National Security Council . . . 530

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Fourth anniversary of Naro (Eisenhower, Dulles) . . . 525

Prisoners of War

Proposals for settlement of Korean prisoner-of-war question (Chou En-lai, White, Clark, Molotov) . . . 526

State, Department of

Department opposes continuation of extraordinary restrictions on certain agricultural imports (texts of notes) . . . 554

Strategic Materials

International Materials Conference . . . 548

Technical Cooperation and Development

Technical cooperation agreement with Pakistan . . . 531

Trade

Control of shipments to Communist China, North Korea . . . 532

Department opposes continuation of extraordinary restrictions on certain agricultural imports (texts of notes) . . . 554

Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Japan . . . 531

Treaty Information

Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Japan . . . 531

United Nations

Current U.N. documents: A selected bibliography . . . 538

Czechoslovak subversion charges against U.S. refuted (Lodge) . . . 539

Economic and Social Council . . . 550

Progress toward universal equal suffrage (Hahn) . . . 546

Proposal for settlement of Korean prisoner-of-war question (Chou En-lai, White, Clark, Molotov) . . . 526

Review of the Ecw Economic Survey of Europe (Camp) . . . 534

U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs . . . 550

U.S. in the U.N. . . . 551

Name Index

Adenauer, Konrad	529
Allen, George V.	523
Allison, John M.	553
Anslinger, Harry J.	550
Camp, Miriam	534
Chou En-lai	526
Clark, General	526
Cutler, Robert	530
Dulles, Secretary	524, 525, 532
Eisenhower, President	524, 525, 530
Hahn, Mrs. Lorena B.	546
Kotschnig, Walter M.	550
Linder, Harold F.	554
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.	539
Lord, Mrs. Oswald	549
McCarthy, Senator	532
Molotov, V. M.	526
Murphy, Robert D.	531
Okazaki, Katsuo	531
Sao Hkun Hkio	530
Sebald, William	530
Taft, William Howard III.	553
Wadsworth, James J., Jr.	550
White, Lincoln	528

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
†161	3/30	Poland: Publication attacking U.S.
162	3/30	U.N. Commission on narcotics
163	3/31	Gen. Clark: Repatriation of sick Pow's
164	3/31	15th session of Ecosoc
165	3/31	Commission on human rights
166	4/1	Linder: Section 104 restrictions
167	4/1	Adenauer: Itinerary of U.S. visit
168	4/1	Dulles-McCarthy meeting
†169	4/1	Non-renewal of VOA contracts
170	4/2	Friendship treaty with Japan
†171	4/2	Validation of German dollar bonds
172	4/3	Suppl. Pt. 4 agreement with Pakistan
173	4/3	Assessment of Soviet gestures

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.